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The "cyberworld" in which we live has fundamentally and irrevocably
changed the nature of human interaction. For many, electronic mail, text-
ing, and social networking sites have significantly limited traditional face-
to-face interaction. While the benefits of technological progress are self-
evident, the ease with which people can share personal information virtu-
ally has also produced troubling byproducts. The transmission of sexually
provocative images between teenagers, known colloquially as "sexting," is
one such example. As suicides and other sexting-related tragedies multiply,
jurisdictions coast-to-coast are searching frantically for ways to curb the
practice.
Due to the harshness of existing criminal statutes, legislators have fa-
vored the creation of a separate sexting offense to address misconduct. Be-
cause these new laws vary greatly in both content and severity of prescribed
penalties, some have argued that they are unprincipled. In light of contem-
porary societal disinterest in prosecuting consensual sexual activity between
adolescents, critics also consider them misguided and anachronistic.
These allegations suffer from their failure to place anti-sexting initiatives
in proper historical context. These laws represent a present-day manifesta-
tion of the protectionist and paternalistic impulses that motivated statutory
rape laws in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. Both anti-sexting and statu-
tory rape laws share the same fundamental goal: avoiding reputational ruin
and its untoward consequences. Whereas sexual intercourse was once the
necessary catalyst, electronic devices used to disseminate sexually explicit
material now create the risk. In today's virtual world, sexting represents a
sort of statutory rape by proxy where cell phones, laptops, and iPads pro-
vide the violative act that can ruin lives. In sum, the campaign to outlaw
sexting is neither misguided nor anachronistic. It reflects a widespread be-
lief in the need to protect adolescents from sexting-related harm, coupled
with a paternalistic desire to restore some of the moral innocence that is
rapidly disappearing in the teenage cyberworld.
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. J.D. 1988, Yale Law
School; M. Phil. 1985, University of Cambridge; A.B. 1983, Harvard University. Many
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I. INTRODUCTIONTHE increasingly sophisticated and pervasive "cyberworld" in
which we live has fundamentally and irrevocably changed the na-
ture of human interaction. Before the 1980s,.the vast majority of
interpersonal communications were either face-to-face or telephonic
through "land lines." Some thirty years later, computers and cell phones
have largely replaced these traditional forms of interaction with elec-
tronic mail, texting, and social networking sites that allow individuals to
transmit information, both verbal and visual, with the click of a button.
While the benefits of this rapid and revolutionary technological progress
are self-evident, the ease with which people can share personal informa-
tion virtually has also produced troubling byproducts. The transmission of
sexually provocative images by and among young people, known collo-
quially as "sexting," is one such example. Legislatures coast-to-coast are
searching for ways to curb the practice.
Remedial efforts have varied greatly. In some instances, prosecutors
have alleged that sexting violates child pornography laws and, as such, is
a felony mandating incarceration and subsequent inclusion on sex of-
fender registries. Concern about the severity of this approach has pro-
duced a panoply of proposed and enacted state laws in recent years that
create a separate sexting offense with lesser penalties, ranging from civil
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to criminal. Like the sanctions, the definition of sexting varies with re-
spect to age, conduct, and state of mind requirements.
Critics have assailed this legislative and prosecutorial response to teen-
age sexting as unprincipled, misguided, and potentially unconstitutional.
While I share some of these concerns, I believe that anti-sexting commen-
tators have failed to place these laws in proper historical context. Anti-
sexting laws are a present-day manifestation of the protectionist and pa-
ternalistic impulses that motivated statutory rape laws in the 18th, 19th,
and 20th centuries. The physical and psychological danger an adolescent
risks by sexting has replaced Victorian-era concerns about the loss of
marital prospects that flowed from loss of virginity. However, anti-sexting
and statutory rape laws share the same fundamental goal: avoiding
reputational ruin and its untoward consequences. Whereas sexual inter-
course was once the necessary catalyst, electronic devices used to dissemi-
nate sexually explicit material now create the risk. In today's virtual
world, sexting represents a sort of statutory rape by proxy where cell
phones, laptops, and iPads provide the means for the violative act that
ruins lives.
This Article contains seven parts. Part I defines sexting and its associ-
ated dangers. Part II addresses the traditional criminal law offenses pros-
ecutors have charged in the sexting context, most notably child
pornography. Part III describes the range of anti-sexting initiatives that
exist today, both proposed and enacted, focusing on the four principal
parameters: age, conduct, state of mind, and penalties. Part IV travels the
"road to sexting," from the common law to the present. It begins with the
evolution and enforcement of statutory rape laws and finishes with a dis-
cussion of how modern prosecutorial disinterest in punishing consensual
sexual behavior between adolescents as statutory rape fuels criticism of
anti-sexting initiatives. Parts V and VI respond to the critics and argue
that anti-sexting laws are neither arbitrary nor anachronistic. Instead,
these laws represent a reinvigoration of the protectionism and paternal-
ism that historically motivated the enforcement of the statutory rape
laws. Part VII offers some concluding thoughts about the content of anti-
sexting laws and their relationship to cyber-bullying in general.
II. SEXTING AND ITS DANGERS
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines "sexting" as "the send-
ing of sexually explicit photographs or messages via mobile phone."'
While persons of all ages can sext,2 the practice is typically associated
1. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 1320 (12th ed. 2011); see also Miller v.
Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (complaint defines sexting as "send-
ing or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, including nude or semi-nude
photographs, via cellular telephones or over the Internet").
2. In one of the most infamous and highly publicized sexting incidents, New York
Congressman Anthony Weiner sent suggestive photos and messages to six women and ulti-
mately resigned in the wake of the scandal. Raymond Hernandez, In Chaotic Scene, Weiner
Quits Seat in Scandal's Wake, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at Al.
2013]1 113
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with teenagers and young adults for whom sexting is commonplace. For
example, the National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Preg-
nancy found that 19% of respondents aged thirteen to nineteen had
transmitted a sexually suggestive image of themselves electronically and
31% had received a nude or semi-nude picture or video.3 The incidence
was even greater for adults aged twenty to twenty-six. 4 While the study's
methodology was flawed in certain respects,5 its results are generally con-
sistent with those reported elsewhere. 6
The widespread use of sexting in the personal relationships of teenag-
ers and young adults provides a recipe for disaster. Consider Jessica Lo-
gan. Jessica sent a nude photo of herself to her boyfriend. When they
broke up, the boyfriend forwarded the cell phone photo to classmates. As
news of the photo spread, Jessica's classmates threw things at her and
abused her verbally, calling her "slut," "whore," and "skank." She ap-
pealed to the school guidance counselors and local police for help, but the
harassment continued. In July 2008, one month after her high school
graduation, Jessica hanged herself in her bedroom closet.7 Thirteen-year-
old Hope Witsell's story is eerily similar and ends with the same tragic
result.8
3. See THE NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, SEX
AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 11 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter SEX & TECH SURVEY], available at http:// www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/
SexTech_-Summary.pdf.
4. 32% reported sending a picture or video and 46% reported receiving one. Id.
5. For example, Teenage Research Unlimited, which conducted the survey, did not
use random sampling procedures. Instead, volunteers were self-selected through an online
magazine's website. Id. at 1, 5.
6. See, e.g., Cox's New Survey on Cyber-Safety Finds Many Teens Going Online Wire-
lessly Without Limits or Controls, Cox COMMC'NS, INC. (May 14, 2009), http://www.harris
interactive.com/vault/Client NewsCoxCommunicationsNCMEC2009 05.pdf. The Pew
Internet and American Life Project reported less activity than the Sex & Tech Survey,
finding that 15% of cell phone-owning teens ages twelve to seventeen had received sext
messages. Only 4% had sexted images to someone else. See AMANDA LENHART, PEW IN-
TERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECr TEENS AND SEXTING: HOW AND WHY MINOR TEENS
ARE SENDING SEXUALLY SUGGESTIVE NUDE OR NEARLY NUDE IMAGES VIA TEXT MES-
SAGING 4-5 (2009), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/teens-and-sexting.pdf. A
recent survey of 1,560 youth reported even lower figures, finding that only 2.5% of partici-
pants had appeared in or received a nude or semi-nude photo or video. See Kimberly J.
Mitchell et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Youth Sexting: A National Study, 129 PEDI-
ATRICS 1, 7 (2011).
7. See generally Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide Over Sexting, TODAY
(Mar. 6, 2009), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/2954630/ns/today-parenting-and-family/+/
her-teen-committed-suicide-over-sexting.pdf; Jessica Logan Suicide: Parents of Dead Teen
Sue School, Friends Over Sexting Harassment, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/07/jessica-logan-suicide-par n_382825.html; Teen Hangs
Herself After Harassment For a "Sexting" Message, Parents Say, COURTHOUSE NEWS SER-
VICE (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.courthousenews.com/2009/12/07/TeenHangsHerself
AfterHarassmentFor_aSextingMessageParentsSay.html.
8. Like Jessica, Hope endured ruthless taunts from classmates after a photo of her
bare breasts that she sent to her boyfriend went viral. Sadly, she did not share her misery
with her parents; they only learned of the extent of her pain and humiliation after she hung
herself in September 2009. See Randi Kaye, How a Cell Phone Picture Led to Girl's Sui-
cide, CNN (Oct. 7, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-07/living/hope.witsells.story_1-
photo-new-school-year-scarves.
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While sexted images are usually sent to the original recipient intention-
ally and voluntarily, this is not always the case. On September 19, 2010,
Rutgers University freshman Dharun Ravi used his computer webcam to
surreptitiously film a sexual encounter between his roommate, Tyler Cle-
menti, and another man. Ravi then streamed the video online. Clementi
had not publicly acknowledged his homosexuality. When he learned what
Ravi had done, he jumped to his death from the George Washington
Bridge.9
While the tragic consequences of the foregoing incidents are excep-
tional, they illustrate the core harms associated with sexting. First, once
placed into the virtual universe, sexted images can find their way into the
mailboxes of a potentially infinite number of recipients. For example, af-
ter "tweeting" that he had secretly filmed Tyler Clementi "making out
with a dude," Dharun Ravi streamed the sexual encounter live on the
internet for anyone to see.10 In the case of Hope Witsell, who sexted a
topless photo the week before summer break, someone using the cell
phone of the original recipient sent the photo to numerous third parties."
In a matter of days, the distribution was so widespread that Hope's
friends escorted her between classes to protect her from a barrage of ver-
bal abuse. 12
Because of this potentially unbridled proliferation of adolescent sexts,
some worry that these sexts will ultimately end up in the hands of adults
who sexually exploit minors.13 Child pornographers have created an esti-
mated fourteen million websites1 4 where some 20,000 images are posted
each week.' 5 At present, this concern is largely speculative. If it proves
accurate, legislative and prosecutorial action would be warranted in light
of the serious nature of corresponding social harms.16
9. See generally Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at Al; Emily Friedman, Victim of Secret Dorm Sex Tape Posts
Facebook Goodbye, Jumps to His Death, ABC WORLD NEWS (Sept. 29, 2010), http://
abcnews.go.com/US/victim-secret-dorm-sex-tape-commits-suicide/story?id=11758716; Ed
Pilkington, Tyler Clementi, Student Outed as Gay on Internet, Jumps to His Death, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/30/tyler-clementi-
gay-student-suicide.
10. See Beth DeFalco & Geoff Mulvihill, N.J. Student Kills Self After Sex Broadcast,
WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
09/29/AR2010092907338.html.
11. See Andrew Meacham, A Shattered Self-Image, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 29,
2009, at 1A.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate
Societal Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 1, 9-18
(2007).
14. ROBERTA LYNN SINCLAIR & DANIEL SUGAR, THE NAT'L CHILD EXPLOITATION
COORDINATION CTR. (NCECC) STRATEGIC & OPERATIONS SUPPORT SERVS. RESEARCH
AND DEV., INTERNET BASED SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH ENVIRON-
MENTAL SCAN 7 (2005), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/downloaddoi=
10.1.1.114.8472&rep=repl&type=pdf.
15. See id.
16. While a lengthy discussion of the federal constitutional rights that sexting may
implicate is beyond the purview of this article, courts have addressed constitutional de-
fenses raised in this context. See generally Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D.
2013] 115
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Potential infiltration by the child pornography industry is not, however,
the only danger sexting poses to minors. Researchers have found that
adolescents' lack of maturity can lead them to act impetuously,' 7 without
considering the long-term consequences of their actions.' 8 Risk takers by
nature,19 "adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every
category of reckless behavior." 20 They are, in addition, more vulnerable
than adults to negative influences and external pressure from peers. 21
Compared to adults, then, adolescents are more likely to engage in im-
pulsive, risky behavior influenced by the desire to gain approval from
peers, as opposed to meaningful consideration of potentially negative
downstream consequences. Therefore, in a flight of fancy, a teenager may
use his or her cell phone to take and transmit a sexually provocative
photo in response to encouragement by friends or a potential suitor.
While these actions take no more than a minute, errors in judgment can
lead to a crisis that lasts much longer. Unfortunately, girls seem especially
vulnerable to these risks.
The publication in 1982 of In a Different Voice, psychologist Carol Gil-
ligan's groundbreaking study of female psychological development, 22 in-
Pa. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010) (vindicating First
Amendment claim under U.S. Constitution); A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2007) (denying right to privacy claim under the Florida state constitution); Claudio J.
Pavia, Note, Constitutional Protection of "Sexting" in the Wake of Lawrence: The Rights of
Parents and Privacy, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 189 (2011).
17. See, e.g., LINDA P. SPEAR, THE BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE OF ADOLESCENCE
142-43 (2010) (noting the adolescent tendency to act impulsively and display "limited self-
control").
18. See Praveen Kambam & Christopher Thompson, The Development of Decision-
Making Capacities in Children and Adolescents: Psychological and Neurological Perspec-
tives and Their Implications for Juvenile Defendants, 27 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 173, 175 (2009)
(finding that adolescents are less "future oriented" than adults); Elizabeth S. Scott et al.,
Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 221,
231 (1995) (citing empirical studies suggesting that adolescents "discount the future more
than adults and ... weigh more heavily the sort-term consequences of decisions").
19. For example, adolescents commonly engage in activities that pose a risk to bodily
safety, such as sky diving, car racing, and excessive use of drugs and alcohol. See Audrey K.
Gordon, The Tattered Cloak of Immortality, in ADOLESCENCE AND DEATH 16, 27 (Charles
A. Corr & Joan N. McNeil eds., 1986).
20. Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12
DEv. REV. 339 (1992); see also Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adoles-
cence: A Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEv. REV. 1 (1992).
21. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 128-35 (1968) (discussing
adolescence as a period of "identity confusion," during which individuals are "preoccupied
with what they appear to be in the eyes of others as compared with what they feel they
are"); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003) ("[S]ubstantial research supports the conventional
wisdom that, even in middle adolescence, teenagers are more responsive to peer influence
than are adults."); Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational
Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1277 (2000) ("[Peers influence]
the process by which choices are made, the adolescent's attitudes about those choices, and
how those choices fit with the adolescent's evolving sense of self.").
22. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THE-
ORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
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spired a wealth of research into this previously unexplored area.23 The
studies underscore the emotional distress that adolescent girls typically
feel, fueled by an erosion of self-confidence and self-esteem far greater
than that experienced by their male counterparts. 24 Teenage girls also
manifest disproportionately high rates of anxiety and depression and at-
tempt suicide at twice the rate of boys of similar age.25 The loss of self-
control that results from physical changes fosters self-doubt and anxi-
ety.26 As their bodies mature, adolescent girls suddenly find that they are
the subjects of male sexual desire. At the same time, popular culture
bombards them with highly sexualized images of girls and young women
designed to appeal to men.2 7 Adolescents tend to idolize celebrities and
mimic their behavior, even when that behavior is risky or results in nega-
tive consequences. 28
In sum, adolescence is an emotional minefield for girls. In a relatively
short space of time, everything around them changes: the way they look;
academic expectations and performance; and social interactions, espe-
cially with boys who now view girls as potential partners in intimate rela-
tionships. As having a boyfriend becomes increasingly important and
desirable, popular culture tells girls to dress and act in an appropriately
"feminine" way.2 9 Once they enter an intimate relationship, girls must
then strive to sustain it by keeping their boyfriend happy. This requires a
balancing act of sorts as girls attempt to satisfy their partner's desire for
23. See generally LYN MIKEL BROWN & CAROL GILLIGAN, MEETING AT THE CROSS-
ROADS: WOMEN'S PSYCHOLOGY AND GIRLs' DEVELOPMENT (1992); MARY PIPHER, REVIV-
ING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS (1994); CHRISTINA HoFF
SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST Boys: How MISGUIDED FEMINISM Is HARMING OUR
YOUNG MEN (2000); Annie G. Rogers, Voice, Play, and a Practice of Ordinary Courage in
Girls' and Women's Lives, 63 HARV. EDUc. REv. 265 (1993).
24. WELLESLEY COLLEGE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, How ScHooLS
SHORTCHANGE GIRLS: THE AAUW REPORT 2 (1992) [hereinafter AAUW REPORT].
25. See U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 152, 161 (1999).
26. See ELIZABETH DEBOLD ET AL., MOTHER DAUGHTER REVOLUTION: FROM GooD
GIRLS To GREAT WOMEN 59 (1993) (noting that most girls do not experience maturational
changes in body shape as empowering). Adolescent girls' eroding self-confidence also di-
minishes their academic achievement in middle and high school. AAUW REPORT, supra
note 24.
27. For example, the music industry's most popular female performers-including
Lady Gaga, Rihanna, and Katy Perry-typically wear extremely revealing clothing, sing
songs with overt sexual content, and use sexually-charged choreography in live perform-
ances and music videos. Television programs popular among adolescent girls, such as Jersey
Shore and Glee, likewise feature sexually active teenage girls and young women who dress
and behave in a sexually provocative manner to attract men and boys.
28. Studies show that the sexual activities of celebrities, when widely covered by the
media, influence teenagers' sexual behavior and attitudes. See Rebecca L. Collins et al.,
Watching Sex on Television Predicts Adolescent Initiation of Sexual Behavior, 114 PEDIAT-
RICS e280, e287 (2004) (longitudinal study showing "substantial associations between the
amount of sexual content viewed by adolescents and advances in their sexual behavior
during the subsequent year").
29. Adolescent girls tend to equate femininity with "niceness," which leads to reluc-
tance to voice their opinions or communicate their desires. DEBOLD ET AL., supra note 26,
at 53, 93-94; AAUW REPORT, supra note 24, at 3.
SMU LAW REVIEW
sexual contact without appearing too "loose" or "easy,"30 labels that
often lead female peers to ostracize or shun them.31
The decision whether to accede to a boyfriend's request for sexual in-
tercourse looms large in this context. On the one hand, adolescent girls
are mindful of possible reputational harm, pregnancy, and disease,32 and
many are not motivated by their own sexual desire or enjoyment of the
experience.33 On the other hand, in battling the insecurities and dimin-
ished self-concept that plague most teenage girls, they look to boyfriends
to affirm their desirability and satisfy their need for emotional attach-
ment.34 If agreeing to have sex is necessary to gain a boyfriend's alle-
giance, it is a condition many girls are willing to accept.35
That said, recent data indicate that adolescent girls are becoming less
likely to engage in sexual intercourse. A longitudinal study, published in
October 2011 by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), mea-
sured the percentage of teenagers aged fifteen through nineteen who had
ever had sex. 3 6 Researchers divided the respondents into two age groups:
fifteen to seventeen and eighteen to nineteen.37 They compiled data from
2006 to 2010 and compared their results to those obtained in similar
surveys in 2002, 1995, and 1988.38 With respect to girls, the percentages of
sexually active fifteen- to seventeen-year-olds declined from 1995 to 2002
(38.0% to 30.3%) and continued to do so in 2006 to 2010 (27.0%). For
older teens, after showing virtually no change from 1995 to 2002 (68.0%
to 68.8%), percentages declined in 2006 to 2010 (62.7%).39
Some attribute the decrease in sexual activity to the success of pro-
30. See Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Con-
struction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 Wm. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 345 (2003) (noting
that the fear of being labeled a "slut" dissuades adolescent girls from having too much sex).
31. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts,
19 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 221, 230 (1995) (noting that adolescents are highly averse to
social ostracism).
32. Deborah L. Tolman, Doing Desire: Adolescent Girls' Struggles for/with Sexuality, 8
GENDER & Soc'Y 324, 336 (1994).
33. See Michelle Fine, Sexuality, Schooling, and Adolescent Females: The Missing Dis-
course of Desire, 58 HARV. Eouc. REV. 29, 36-37 (1988). See generally DEBOLD ET AL.,
supra note 26 (girls are motivated by the desire to give pleasure to others).
34. See, e.g., Tolman, supra note 32, at 328-29 (discussing Rochelle who first had sex
during her sophomore year to please her boyfriend whom she needed to make her life
complete).
35. It is lamentable that adolescent girls face this decision at a time when their
psychosocial development compromises self-confidence in identifying and declaring physi-
cal boundaries. As Michelle Oberman notes, "the implications of this convergence of bod-
ily maturity and moral dispossession are particularly disturbing because male sexual
initiative remains a societal norm." Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-
Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 59 (1994)
[hereinafter Oberman, Turning Girls into Women].
36. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., TEENAGERS IN THE UNITED STATES: SEXUAL
AcnviTY, CONTRACEPTIVE USE AND CHILDBEARING, 2006-2010 SURVEY OF FAMILY
GROWTH 14 (2011) [hereinafter NCHS REPORT].
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id.
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grams that encourage abstinence.40 Others disagree, noting the absence
of conclusive proof of the efficacy of such programs.41 Regardless of
whether and to what extent these programs are effective, their overall
impact on national data is necessarily limited since 50% of states have
refused federal funding for abstinence education.42
A closer look at the NCHS report suggests a different theory. While
sexual experience among eighteen- and nineteen-year-old boys decreased
significantly from 1995 to 2002 (75.4% to 64.3%), it has since leveled off
(63.9% in 2006-2010).43 For girls of the same age, the opposite trend
emerges. While the percentage who were sexually active was basically
unchanged from 1995 to 2002 (68.0% and 68.8%, respectively), that fig-
ure has decreased in the most recent data (62.7%).44 During this same
period, technological advances and a sharp spike in cell phone ownership
among American adolescents made texting the norm and sexting com-
monplace.45 Perhaps, then, teenage girls who were having sex to please
their boyfriends are discovering a "virtual" way to satisfy their partners'
desire for sexual activity.46
While most would applaud an adolescent girl's decision to delay sexual
intercourse, the sexting alternative presents its own risks and dangers. In
the Sex & Tech Survey, one-fourth of the girls stated that nude or semi-
nude images intended for someone else were shared with them, and 36%
considered this practice "common."47 Thus, when girls send a sexually
provocative image, many expect that it will be shared with unintended
third parties. Given this recognition of the sender's ultimate lack of con-
trol over distribution, it is not surprising that 75% of teens acknowledged
40. See, e.g., Christine Kim & Robert Rector, Evidence on the Effectiveness of Absti-
nence Education: An Update 2 (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2010/02/evidence-on-the-effectiveness-of-abstinance-eduction-an-update (concluding that
abstinence education produces statistically significant, positive results, such as delayed sex-
ual initiation and reduced levels of early sexual activity).
41. See, e.g., Domestic Abstinence-Only Programs: Assessing the Evidence: Hearing
Before the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, U.S. House of Representatives,
110th Congress 5 (2008) (statement of Harvey V. Fineberg, M.D., Ph.D., President, Insti-
tute of Medium of the Nat'l Academies), available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/
ocga/testimony/AbstinenceOnlySex-EdPrograms andHIV Infection.asp (reporting
that abstinence-only programs have no effect on incidents of unprotected vaginal sex, num-
ber of sex partners, or sexual initiation compared to controls).
42. See Accuracy, Efficacy and Ethics of Abstinence-Only Programs Questioned by
Public Health Experts, SCIENCEDAILY 2 (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2008/09/080916143912.htm (noting that, as of August 2008, twenty-five states had
refused federal funding for abstinence programs because of concerns about their accuracy
and efficacy).
43. NCHS REPORT, supra note 36.
44. Id.
45. See AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, TEENS,
SMARTPHONES & TEXTING 5 (2012), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media/Files/
Reports/2012/PIPTeensSmartphonesandTexting.pdf; supra text accompanying notes
3-6.
46. In the Sex & Tech Survey, of the 22% of teenage girls who reported sexting nude
or semi-nude pictures of themselves, 71% sent these images to a boyfriend. SEX & TECH
SURVEY, supra note 3, at 1-2.
47. Id. at 3.
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that sending sexually suggestive content "can have serious negative
consequences." 4 8
For adolescent girls, the risk of psychological trauma is especially acute.
When sexually explicit images are made public, girls are far more likely
than boys to face vilification and rejection by peers.49 When added to the
depression, anxiety, and diminished self-confidence many adolescent fe-
males experience, this social isolation and verbal abuse can create feel-
ings of worthlessness leading to a variety of self-destructive behaviors.50
While there is as yet no formal body of research addressing adolescent
sexting victimization, psychologists have reported symptoms associated
with post-traumatic stress disorder similar to those experienced by rape
victims.51
The details of documented cases of sexting abuse powerfully illustrate
the potential for severe psychological dislocation. As in the Jessica Logan
and Hope Witsell tragedies, 52 Victims' stories typically begin with the
transmission of a sexually explicit photo to a boyfriend and end with the
distribution of that image to numerous unintended parties after the rela-
tionship ends. Sometimes, responsibility for the disclosure rests squarely
with the former partner. For example, after Alex Phillips's sixteen-year-
old girlfriend broke up with him, the seventeen-year-old posted on his
MySpace account two nude photos she had sent him some months ear-
lier.5 3 The first presented full frontal nudity and the second, the vaginal
and anal area.54 While the pictures were eventually removed, Phillips re-
fused a request by local police to do so, notwithstanding the victim's emo-
tional distress.55
Typically, where sexting occurs in the context of a relationship, the
sender and recipient also have in-person contact, like Phillips and his vic-
tim. 5 6 However, in today's cyberworld, this is not strictly necessary. Con-
48. Id.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. That there is no male equivalent for
"slut" is a ready example of the disparate way in which society regards male and female
sexual expression. See Sol Saporta, Language in a Sexist Society, in STUDIES IN DESCRIP-
TIVE AND HISTORICAL LINGuISrIcS 209, 211 (Paul Hopper ed., 1977) ("Interestingly
enough, male whore and male slut are a little incongruous in most dialects.").
50. See generally Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Repro-
ductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324.
51. See, e.g., Elizabeth Donovan, How the Social Network Is Changing Teen Victimiza-
tion, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 2 (May 2, 2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/youth-
and-tell/201105/how-the-social-network-is-changing-teen-victimization.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
53. See Susan Donaldson James, Child Porn Charge for MySpace Revenge Pics, ABC
NEWS (May 23, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/child-porn-charge-myspace-revenge-
pics/story?id=4912041.
54. Complaint at 2, State v. Phillips, No. 08CF309 (Wis. Cir. Ct. May 20, 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/file/teen-nabbed-naked-myspace-photos. Under one
of the photos, Phillips included a sexually explicit caption that graphically referenced his
girlfriend's body and their sexual history. Id.
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sider, for example, the story of a Georgia teenager whom I will refer to as
"Beth." Beth's odyssey began in the seventh grade, when she started
spending time in online chat rooms.57 At first, her new "friends" per-
suaded Beth to post her artwork and some photos of herself.58 Eventu-
ally, a male, who had taken a special interest in her, convinced fourteen-
year-old Beth to post nude and semi-nude photos. 59 Beth posted addi-
tional photos, but stopped doing so after getting her driver's license and a
"live" boyfriend. Refusing to accept her decision, Beth's online admirer
began blackmailing her, threatening to send the photos to her friends and
to "ruin" her parents. 60 In the end, when Beth was seventeen, a fellow
student found the nude photos online and notified school personnel.61 By
this time, dozens of classmates possessed the images.62
Beth now realizes that these photos will exist forever in cyberspace. For
now, she has to endure immature freshman looking at her and laughing. 63
By publicizing her story, she hopes others will learn from her mistakes
and avoid the pain that she is suffering. 64
Finally, while Alex Phillips and Beth's online suitor acted unilaterally
in making the offending photos public, the original recipient is not always
directly responsible when widespread dissemination to third parties re-
sults. 6 5 In Lacey, Washington, when fourteen-year-old Margarite was dat-
ing Isaiah, also fourteen, she sent him a naked photo of herself.66 When
they broke up, Isaiah forwarded the photo to a female friend.67 That
classmate then proceeded to distribute it to the entire list of contacts on
her cell phone. She included the following message: "Ho Alert! If you
think this girl is a whore, then text this to all your friends."68 Soon, hun-
dreds, "possibly thousands," of students had received the photo.69 By the
following day, it was "as if Margarite . .. had sauntered naked down the
hallways of the four middle schools . . . ."1o Looking for a fresh start,
57. The foregoing details regarding "Beth's" story were reported by the Atlanta Jour-
nal Constitution. See Bo Emerson, Sexting 'A Shadow' over Teenager, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(May 12, 2011), http://www.ajc.comlifestyle/sexting-a-shadow-over-teenager/nQtlKh/.
58. Id.






65. Emerson, supra note 57; James, supra note 53.




69. Id.; see also Jeremy Pawloski, Third Lacey Student Charged in Nude-Photo 'Sext-
ing' Case, OLYMPIAN (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.theolympian.com/2010/01/29/1119293/two-
lacey-teens-arrested-in-sexting.html.
70. Hoffman, supra note 66; see also Michelle Esteban et al., 3 Teens Arrested in 'Sext-
ing' Case, Charges Expected After Photos of Naked Girl, 14, Sent to Teens at 4 Middle




Margarite transferred to a different school district.7' Unfortunately, it
was not long before the photo began circulating among students there,
and vicious taunts from female classmates soon followed. 72 In the end,
Margarite transferred back to her original school district where she still
had friends.73
That the adolescent victims discussed thus far are disproportionately
female is not meant to exclude boys from the equation. While fewer in
number, there are documented cases of victimization of adolescent males
through sexting. However, in contrast to girls, the dissolution of an inti-
mate relationship is typically not the catalyst for the distribution of the
sexually explicit image in these cases.
For example, a teenager targeted by eighteen-year-old Matthew Bean
never even met his tormenter. Searching on 4chan, an "imageboard"
launched in 2003 where people can post photos and discuss a variety of
topics, 7 4 Bean found sexually explicit photos of a twelve- or thirteen-
year-old boy posted five years earlier. Working with others in his "web
group," Bean discovered the boy's identity. Posing as a school parent con-
cerned about the "beastly behavior" depicted in the photos, Bean then
forwarded the photos to teachers and administrators at the teenager's
Philadelphia-area high school. The web group also posted taunts about
the victim, hoping to drive him to commit suicide. Fortunately, their plan
was unsuccessful.
Adolescent males may also be victims of "sextortion,"75 typically by
participating in a fraudulent scheme in which they are duped into sending
nude photos to a sexual predator posing as an attractive female.76 For
example, in Putnam County, Tennessee, a seventeen-year-old boy, posing
as a girl, persuaded eighty boys, aged eleven to seventeen, to send him
nude photos.77 Once they did, he would threaten to tell the police unless
they sent more.78
Nineteen-year-old Anthony Stancl's predatory activity went even fur-
ther. Posing as a female classmate on Facebook in 2008, Standl convinced
more than thirty high school boys in New Berlin, Wisconsin to send na-
71. Hoffman, supra note 66.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Frequently Asked Questions, 4 CHAN.ORG, http://www.4chan.org/faq (last visited
Oct. 10, 2012).
75. See Sherry Capps Cannon, OMG! "Sexting": First Amendment Right or Felony?,38 S.U. L. REv. 293, 295-96 (2011) (discussing "sextortion" as "online sexual blackmail");
see also Clay Calvert et al., Playing Legislative Catch-Up in 2010 with a Growing, High-
Tech Phenomenon: Evolving Statutory Approaches for Addressing Teen Sexting, 11 U.
Prrr. J. TECH. L. POL'Y 1, 22 (2010) (discussing criminal law approaches to sextortion
cases).
76. Of course, girls can also fall prey to sextortion, as "Beth's" sexually charged online
relationship with a friend-turned-blackmailer illustrates. See supra text accompanying
notes 56-64.
77. Marcus Washington, Police: 80 Boys Fall Victim to 'Sexting' Scheme, NEWS
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ked photos of themselves.7 9 Stancl then used the photos to blackmail the
senders unless they agreed to engage in sexual activity with him.80 At
least seven boys aged fifteen to seventeen acquiesced, submitting to re-
peated acts of oral and anal copulation. Standl recorded those incidents.8 '
Because male sexual promiscuity does not create reputational harm,
the association between the dissemination of nude photos and psycholog-
ical trauma is far weaker for boys than it is for girls. However, when the
images depict homosexual activity, as in the Tennessee and Wisconsin
cases, that distinction disappears. 8 2 The strong link between status and
perceived masculinity encourages stereotypically male behavior, like
showing sexual interest in girls. Viewed as feminine, same-sex conduct
directly undermines this ideal. As a result, boys who engage in this behav-
ior face a serious risk of rejection by male peers.83 Notwithstanding in-
creasing public acceptance of same-sex lifestyles, especially among
teenagers and young adults,84 homophobia remains "a central organizing
principle of our cultural definition of manhood."85
Viewed collectively, the foregoing discloses that, for teenagers and
young adults, sexting has become a relatively commonplace form of inter-
action in interpersonal relationships.86 While the sender typically intends
for the image to be viewed solely by the object of his or her affection, the
risk of dissemination to third parties increases when intimate relation-
ships sour or the recipient turns out to be an imposter seeking to extort
sex from the sender.87 While sexting victims can be male or female, the
heightened psychosocial vulnerability of adolescent girls exacerbates the
potential for serious, consequential harm.88
III. "TRADITIONAL" CRIMINAL LAW OPTIONS
In the absence of laws that address sexting specifically, prosecutors
have relied on existing criminal statutes in areas such as child pornogra-
79. See Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Crime and Punishment: Teen Sexting in Context,
115 PENN ST. L. REV. 135, 136-37 (2010).
80. Complaint at 4-5, State v. Stanc, No. 2008WK010779 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 4, 2009),
available at http://www.wired.com/images-blogs/threatlevel/files/redactedstancl.pdf.
81. Laurel Walker, Stancl Gets 15 Years in Prison in Facebook Coercion Case, MIL-
WAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/news/waukesha/85252392
.html.
82. Washington, supra note 77.
83. See Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race and Incarcer-
ation, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1332 (2011).
84. See Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Mar-
riage, GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147662/first-time-majority-
americans-favor-legal-gay-marriage.aspx (stating that 70% of those aged eighteen to thirty-
four support legalizing gay marriage).
85. Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia, in THEORIZING MASCULINITIES
119, 131 (Harry Brod & Michael Kaufman eds., 1994).
86. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
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phy and child enticement to address this conduct. 89 These serious charges
are appropriate in cases where sexting is secondary to the defendants'
egregious, predatory conduct. For example, Anthony Stanel, who ex-
torted sex from a number of juvenile males, was charged with multiple
felonies, including sexual assault, child enticement, and possession of
child pornography.90 As part of a plea agreement, he ultimately pleaded
''no contest" to two sexual assault charges for which the judge sentenced
him to fifteen years in prison followed by thirteen years of extended
supervision.91
Likewise, Matthew Bean, the young man who sent naked pictures of a
teenage boy to teachers and administrators at the boy's high school, was
indicted for federal child pornography offenses. 92 After prosecutors
agreed to dismiss the indictment in exchange for the twenty-year-old's
guilty plea to stalking, the judge sentenced him to forty-five days in fed-
eral prison. 93 Additionally, in 2012, a jury convicted Dharun Ravi, the
college freshman who secretly streamed online his roommate's homosex-
ual encounters in their dorm room, of multiple charges including bias in-
timidation, a hate crime punishable by up to ten years in prison.94 The
judge sentenced Ravi to thirty days in jail and three years probation,
commenting that incarceration is generally inappropriate in the absence
of violence.95
For other defendants, the imposition of felony charges seems excessive
in light of the offenders' age and the less pernicious quality of their ac-
tions.96 Unlike Stanl, Bean, or Ravi, these defendants are not predators,
nor is their misconduct calculated or habitual.97 For example, while Alex
Phillips should be held accountable for impulsively posting naked pic-
tures of his sixteen-year-old ex-girlfriend on his MySpace account, the
filing of felony charges for child pornography and sexual exploitation of a
minor is harsh.98 The latter charge alone carries a potential twelve-year
89. See, e.g., Matt Liebowitz, Cyberbully Gets Prison Time Over Nude Teen Photos,
MSNBC (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.msnbc.com/id/41254133/ns/technology-and-source-
security/&/cyberbully-gets-prison-time-over-nude-teen-photos/.
90. Complaint, supra note 80.
91. See Walker, supra note 81.
92. Liebowitz, supra note 89.
93. Michael Hinkelman, N.J. Man Gets 45 Days for Cyberstalking, Bullying, THE IN-
QUIRER DAILY NEWS (Jan. 19, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-01-19/news/27036152
i1_graphic-photos-e-mail-sexual-assault.
94. Kate Zernike et al., Jury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, at Al. To activate the webcam used to spy on his roommate, Ravi
used the computer of another student, Molly Wei, with her permission and her knowledge
of what Ravi planned to do. Charged with invasion of privacy, Wei was allowed to enter a
pretrial intervention program that requires her to testify at Ravi's trial, perform commu-
nity service, and participate in counseling. If she complies fully, prosecutors will drop all
charges against her. See Nate Schweber, In Fallout of Suicide by Student, a Plea Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2011, at A18.
95. Kate Zernike, 30-Day Term for Spying on Roommate at Rutgers, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 2012, at Al.
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sentence. 99 Likewise, eighteen-year-old Phillip Alpert was charged with
possession and distribution of child pornography, as well as a host of
other offenses, for e-mailing nude photos of his sixteen-year-old girl-
friend to her entire contact list of friends and family following an argu-
ment.100 Sentenced to five years probation after pleading "no contest" to
the distribution charge, Alpert must now register as a sex offender until
he turns forty-three. 101 Jorge Canal faces similar probationary and regis-
tration requirements following his conviction for "knowingly disseminat-
ing obscene material to a minor." 102 Canal, then eighteen, sent a
fourteen-year-old girl a photo of his erect penis, captioned "I love you,"
in response to her repeated requests for naked pictures. 103
Serious charges have been lodged against younger offenders as well.104
In the Washington case involving the widespread distribution of a naked
photo of fourteen-year-old "Margarite," 05 prosecutors filed a felony
charge of dissemination of child pornography against three individuals:
fourteen-year-old Isaiah, who sent the picture to one other person, and
two thirteen-year-old girls, who distributed the photo more broadly.106 If
convicted, they, like Alpert and Canal, would be required to register as
sex offenders. 107
Some alleged child pornography cases do not even involve the distribu-
tion of a sexual image to an unintended third party. In Wyoming County,
Pennsylvania, a high school principal confiscated students' cell phones
and, upon discovering photos of "scantily clad, semi-nude[,] and nude
teenage girls," turned the phones over to the district attorney. 108 After
conducting an investigation, the district attorney identified approximately
twenty students who either owned a cell phone with a sexually provoca-
tive image or were the subject of said image.109 He threatened all of them
with the filing of child pornography charges unless they agreed to com-
plete an education and counseling program.110 The parents of three of the
girls moved to enjoin the filing of criminal charges against their chil-
99. See James, supra note 53.
100. Vicki Mabrey & David Perozzi, "Sexting": Should Child Pornography Laws Ap-
ply?, ABC NEWS (April 1, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/phillip-alpert-sexting-
teen-child-porn/story?id=10252790.
101. Deborah Feyerick & Sheila Steffen, "Sexting" Lands Teen on Sex Offender List,
CNN (April 7, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/07/sexting.busts/.
102. State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009).
103. Brett Trout, Iowa Supreme Court Upholds Sexting Conviction, BLAwGIT (Sept. 18,
2009), http://blawgit.com/2009/09/18/iowa-supreme-court-upholds-sexting-conviction/.
104. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
106. See Hoffman, supra note 66.
107. See Esteban et al., supra note 70. Ultimately, prosecutors agreed to drop the child
pornography charge in exchange for their guilty plea to telephone harassment, a gross
misdemeanor. See Hoffman, supra note 66.
108. Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff'd sub nom.
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2010).
109. Id. at 638.
110. Id. at 640.
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dren. 111 The relevant photos depicted two of the girls, filmed from the
waist up, wearing opaque brassieres; the third girl was wrapped in a
towel, positioned just below her breasts.112 The district court issued a
temporary restraining order against the district attorney, which the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed." 3
More recently, prosecutors in Portage, Indiana charged a fifteen-year-
old high school freshman with juvenile possession of child pornography
"for having naked pictures of two teenage girls on his phone."114 There
was no allegation that the youth transmitted the photos to anyone else.115
In addition, before the charge was filed, one of the two girls acknowl-
edged that she sexted the defendant (and others) voluntarily." 6
To charge minors, especially younger adolescents, with serious sex-re-
lated offenses for impulsive sexting misconduct seems unfair since they
lack the maturity to fully control their actions or to appreciate down-
stream consequences. The justification is even more tenuous in the Penn-
sylvania and Indiana cases where any resultant harm is speculative at
best, since there was no evidence of transmission to unintended third par-
ties.1 7 While the prosecution may ultimately negotiate a deal that allows
the minors to plead to lesser charges, fear of the harsh penalties pre-
scribed for child pornography and related offenses pressures defendants
to accept whatever the prosecution offers. "Rolling the dice" with so
much at stake is a risk most will not want to take.
Moreover, as the tenacity with which the district attorney pursued
charges against the minor plaintiff in Skumanick demonstrates, prosecu-
tors are not always willing to deal.118 In A.H. v. State,119 the appellee
defended the decision to charge A.H., a sixteen-year-old minor, with
''promoting a sexual performance by a child" for posting photos of herself
engaged in sexually explicit conduct with her seventeen-year-old boy-
friend.120 The court agreed that prosecution for this second-degree felony
was justified, even though the photos were never transmitted to, nor
viewed by, third parties.121 The statutory objective of preventing the ex-
ploitation of minors is the same, the court reasoned, whether the person
111. Id.
112. Id. at 639.
113. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010). While the appeal was pending,
the district attorney decided not to pursue charges against two of the three minor plaintiffs.
The Third Circuit upheld the issuance of the temporary restraining order against the third,
concluding that "any prosecution would not be based on probable cause that [the minor]
committed a crime, but instead in retaliation for [her] exercise of her constitutional rights




117. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
119. 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
120. Id. at 235-36. He was additionally charged with "possession of child pornography."
Id. at 235 n.1.
121. Id.
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inducing and promoting the performance is an adult, a minor,122 or, ap-
parently, the victim. 1 2 3
Clark v. Roccanoval2 4 presented the analogous issue of whether fed-
eral child pornography laws could apply to minors. In Roccanova, the
three fourteen-year-old defendants produced "a sexually explicit video"
in which they "coerced, enticed, and persuaded" the fourteen-year-old
plaintiff to participate. 125 The plaintiff sued for civil damages, claiming
that the defendants' conduct constituted "exploitation of a minor child"
in violation of 18 U.S.C. H§ 2251 and 2252.126 The defendants argued that,
because they were minors, the statutes could not apply to them. 1 2 7 The
court disagreed, finding no indication that the harm that flows from child
pornography "could be done only by adult perpetrators." 12 8 The judge
also noted that, while this case presented a novel context, the "relatively
recent rapid emergence of 'sexting' by minors" has fueled prosecutions
elsewhere.129
This burgeoning use of child pornography laws to address such a wide
range of sexting and sexting-related cases not only fosters injustice, but
distorts an offense category whose purpose is to protect, not prosecute,
children.o30 Minors manipulated into performing sexual acts for profit
suffer negative consequences later in life, including difficulty fostering in-
timate relationships, "sexual dysfunctions, and . .. a tendency to become
sexual abusers."'13 Accordingly, child pornography laws target those who
produce and distribute child pornography to prevent the sexual exploita-
tion of minors.132 By contrast, an adolescent who voluntarily creates and
sends a naked or semi-naked photo of him or herself to someone else in
the context of an intimate relationship is not exploited or abused. Thus,
there is no reason to expect the same kind of tragic downstream effects
experienced later in life by minors lured into the pornography industry.
While sexting in the context of an intimate relationship may not victim-
ize the parties involved, the introduction of a sexually provocative image
into cyberspace may prospectively exploit other minors if it ends up in the
122. Id. at 238.
123. Id. Likewise, in State v. Vezzoni, No. 22361-2-III, 2005 WL 980588, at *1 (Wash.
Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2005), the sixteen-year-old defendant appealed his convictions for deal-
ing in and possessing depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The depic-
tions at issue were naked photographs of Vezzoni's sixteen-year-old girlfriend which he
had shown to friends after the couple broke up. Rejecting his appeal, the court disputed
Vezzoni's contention that "the legislature did not intend for child pornography statutes to
apply in situations where teenagers, who are capable of consenting to sexual activity, take
nude photographs of each other." Id.
124. 772 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
125. Id. at 846-47.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 847-48.
128. Id. at 847.
129. Id. at 847-48.
130. Cf. id. at 847.
131. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 n.9 (1982).
132. See id. at 759.
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hands of the wrong people.'33 "[P]edophiles use child pornography," the
Supreme Court has noted, "to seduce other children into sexual activ-
ity."134 Thus, to the extent that criminalizing possession impedes the
availability of these materials for those with "prurient purposes," it is
good public policy.'3 5 But, as discussed earlier, the extent to which
pedophiles are able to access juvenile sexts remains to be seen.136
In sum, then, the emergence of anti-sexting initiatives reflects public
concern over the rapid proliferation of sexting and its potential dangers
to children, balanced against the concomitant recognition that the signifi-
cant penalties specified under current child pornography and obscenity
laws are inappropriate for otherwise innocent minors.137 Reacting to
charges filed against two fifteen-year-olds when a nude photo of one was
found on the cell phone of the other, a sponsor of Ohio's juvenile sexting
proposal commented: "They did something stupid, but I don't think any-
one wants for them to be called sex offenders." 38
Given the factual context of most sexting tragedies, one would expect
that legislative initiatives would focus on the transmission of sexted
images to unintended third parties. To the extent that the criminal law is
used for this purpose, it should be reserved for egregious offenders whose
misconduct is habitual, fraudulent, excessive due to widespread distribu-
tion, or undertaken with a desire to cause harm. For others, noncriminal
sanctions, such as education, counseling, and community service, may be
a more appropriate response.
As we will see in the next section, some states have enacted or pro-
posed laws that adopt this approach by focusing primarily on education-
based intervention for sexting offenses.'3 9 Others, however, go further,
imposing criminal penalties not only on those who disseminate sexted
images to third parties but also on those who possess the image without
regard to its distribution to unintended parties.140 The most aggressive
initiatives go one step further, punishing the sexter him or herself for cre-
ating and transmitting the image in the first place.141
133. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
134. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
135. Id. at 113 n.10 (quoting State v. Young, 525 N.E.2d 1363, 1367-68 (Ohio 1988)).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
137. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
138. Justin McClelland, "Sexting" Legislation Proposed to Protect Teens, WESTERN
STAR (Apr. 14, 2009), http://centerforglobaled.org/sites/default/files/Legislation%
20to%2OSave%2OTeenagers%20(2).doc. To this end, several statutes specify that sex of-
fender registration does not apply to minors who commit sexting violations. See, e.g., NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.737 (West Supp. 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-1.4(d) (2013); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b(b)(2), (3) (West Supp. 2012); H.B. 53, 129th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011).
139. See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 159-84 and accompanying text.
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IV. ANTI-SEXTING INITIATIVES142
According to data gathered by the National Conference of State Legis-
latures, at least thirty-three states and U.S. territories have considered
sexting-related legislation in the past three years. Roughly half have en-
acted laws that address sexting.143 As indicated above, legislative efforts
to curb sexting vary widely in approach and content. 144 Therefore, to ap-
preciate the picture that these laws collectively paint, it is more useful to
focus on prevailing themes than to attempt a state-by-state comparison.
To that end, viewing current anti-sexting proposals and enactments as a
whole, liability for sexting is a function of four key variables: the partici-
pants' age, their state of mind, the nature of their conduct (e.g., transmis-
sion, possession, or distribution), and the sanctions imposed on them. I
will address each in turn.
A. AGE
While adults can be victims of sexting-related misconduct, legislative
interest has revolved principally around minors. 145 Explaining this focus
on adolescents, the California legislature found that sexting "has become
a pervasive problem for many school districts" whose student victims suf-
fer psychological harm from its unforeseen consequences.146 Likewise, in
a statement accompanying its sexting proposal, the New Jersey Assembly
recognized the dangers inherent in the "sexting or posting" of sexual
images by juveniles.147 "The teenage practices of sexting and posting sex-
ual images online," the bill concluded, "are nationwide problems that
have perplexed parents, school administrators, and law enforcement
officials."148
In accordance with these sentiments, anti-sexting initiatives uniformly
apply age-based restrictions to the subject of the sext; none of the statutes
address sexually provocative images depicting someone eighteen or
older.149 In fact, most focus exclusively on minors in all respects. For ex-
ample, in South Dakota, the offense of sexting would apply only to mi-
142. This part focuses on laws, both proposed and enacted, that create sexting offenses.
Alternatively, some states have addressed sexting by modifying existing child pornography
and indecency statutes. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-813.01(3) (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-10-1204(4)(b), (c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2013); H.B. 1042, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2011).
143. See NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 2011 Legislation Related to "Sexting"
(2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-2011.
aspx; Andrew J. Harris & Ava McAlpin, Teen "Sexting" Laws Continue to Evolve, 18 SEX
OFFENDER L. REP. 1, 8 (2012).
144. See discussion supra Part II.
145. See infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
146. S.B. 919, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
147. Assemb. B. 1561, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2010) (adopted as amended in
Assemb. B. 1561, 214th Leg., 2nd Ann. Sess.).
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., S.B. 919, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
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nors who create, transmit, or distribute sexually provocative images.150
Ohio and Florida's statutes include only minors who transmit or dis-
tribute nude images to other minors.151 Some are even more narrow.152
Connecticut's "Act Concerning Sexting" targets only thirteen-to-seven-
teen year-olds. 53 Louisiana goes further yet, applying sexting penalties
only to minors sixteen and younger. 154
While a relatively uncommon feature, some statutes include adults in-
volved in sexting relationships with minors. For example, a bill intro-
duced in Oklahoma would allow criminal penalties for any person
soliciting sexts from minors.155 Vermont, one of the first states to enact
anti-sexting legislation, also imposes criminal sanctions on adults who
possess "indecent visual depiction[s]" of minors.156
The general exclusion of adults is not surprising for two reasons. First,
the tragedies reported in the press have typically involved sexts created,
transmitted, received, and distributed by minors alone.157 Second, child
pornography laws, which generally provide harsher criminal sanctions
than the anti-sexting initiatives, are an available and more appropriate
vehicle to address the conduct of adults who solicit and share sexually
provocative images of minors.158
B. CONDUCT
To appreciate the range of conduct anti-sexting laws can prohibit, it is
useful to consider South Dakota's proposal because of its broad applica-
tion.159 Under this formulation, minors commit the crime of "juvenile
sexting" if they use "any electronic or computerized device" to "create,
produce, distribute, present, transmit, post, exchange or possess" any sex-
ually explicit "visual depiction of a minor."160 It is no defense, moreover,
"that the minor's visual depiction is of himself or herself alone." 161
By virtue of its impressive breadth, this standard seemingly would sub-
ject any juvenile involved in sexting to criminal prosecution, provided the
visual depiction is of a minor. Minors who create the sext are expressly
liable.162 Minors who transmit the sext are also liable, even if the sexual-
150. S.B. 179, 86th Leg. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (S.D. 2011); see also H.B. 815, 195th Gen.
Assemb., 2011 Sess. (Pa. 2011).
151. S.B. 888, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); H.B. 80, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2011); see also H.B. 143, 143rd Gen. Assemb., 10th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011) (persons
under the age of 18).
152. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-196h(a)(1) (2012).
153. Id.; see also H.B. 3130, 119th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. (S.C. 2011) (proposed
sexting statute would apply to minors aged twelve to seventeen only).
154. H.B. 1357, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010) (under the age of seventeen).
155. H.B. 3321, 52nd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2009).
156. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b(a)(1), (a)(2), (c) (West Supp. 2012).
157. See, e.g., supra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Part II.
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ized image is only of the sender.163 Recipients are liable if they are mi-
nors since they "possess" the image, even if they do not forward the sext
to anyone else.'" If, at the time of arrest, minors have deleted the image
and thus no longer "possess" it,165 they are still liable if they "presented"
or distributed the image to a third party before deleting it. Third-party
minor recipients could also be liable for possessing the image and for
transmitting it to someone else.166 Finally, minors who "post" the image
on the web are liable, as are minors who "exchange" sexts depicting a
minor with other individuals.167
While less expansive in their wording, other initiatives ultimately cover
much of the same ground. This breadth of prohibited conduct is curious
since most of these acts are not directly related to extant harms. For ex-
ample, in none of the cases reported thus far has victimization resulted
simply from the voluntary creation of a sext in which the creator alone is
depicted or from its subsequent transmission to and possession by the
intended recipient. 68 Yet, while statutes very rarely enjoin the creation
of the sext,169 many prohibit both its transmission by the creatoro70 and
its possession by the intended recipient.' 7 ' Of course, if preventing wide-
spread distribution is the ultimate goal, then impeding the introduction of
the subject image into virtual space certainly promotes that objective.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. Because the statutes typically do not define "possession," it is unclear if a
minor would be liable if he deleted the sext soon after receiving it. In the child pornogra-
phy context, courts have generally found sufficient evidence of possession of digital images
where the defendant is able to exercise control over them by, for example, deleting them.
See, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1197, 1203-05 (10th Cir. 2002). Cf. United States v. Mason, 233 F.3d
619, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (allowing "innocent possession" defense to federal firearms
charge where defendant's contact with the weapon was innocent and transitory). Texas
focuses instead on the temporal aspect of the possession, providing a defense where the
recipient destroys the sext "within a reasonable amount of time." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 43.261(f)(3) (West Supp. 2013).
166. See S.B. 179, 2011 Leg., 85th Sess. (S.D. 2011).
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
169. Among the states that have enacted anti-sexting laws, only New Jersey proscribes
the creation of a sexually explicit image. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-71.1(c)(1) (West Supp.
2013) (prohibiting "the creation, exhibition or distribution of a photograph depicting
nudity") (emphasis added).
170. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2802b(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (a minor who
"transmit[s] an indecent visual depiction of himself or herself to another person"); H.B. 75,
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011) (a minor who "transmit[s] or distribute[s] to another mi-
nor any photograph or video of himself or herself which depicts nudity"); H.B. 573, 26th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011) (a minor who "transfers to another person .. . a nude depic-
tion of that minor's self"); H.B. 5094, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2011) (a minor
who . . . "transmit[s] an indecent visual depiction of himself or herself to another person").
171. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-196h(a)(1) (2012) (minors aged thirteen to sev-
enteen who "possess any visual depiction of child pornography"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 2802b(a)(2) (persons who "possess a visual depiction [of a minor]"); S.B. 277, 76th Reg.
Sess. (Nev. 2011) (adopted on June 3, 2011) ("possess[ing] a sexual image "of another
minor"); H.B. 815, 195th Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (Pa. 2011) (a minor who "possesses a
depiction of another minor").
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In response, perhaps, to the extensive reach of most sexting initiatives,
some provide an affirmative defense to possession. Vermont removes
criminal liability where an individual takes "reasonable steps, whether
successful or not, to destroy or eliminate the visual depiction." 172 Texas,
Arizona, and Nevada require, in addition, that the individual did not so-
licit the sext.173 In the most rigorous formulation, Florida requires: (1) no
solicitation; (2) no transmission to a third party; and (3) "reasonable
steps" by the possessor to report the sext to his or her guardian, law en-
forcement, or a school official.174
South Dakota's proposal also expressly prohibits the "present[ing]"
and "exchang[ing]" of the image.' 75 Other statutes tend not to include
these terms, 176 perhaps because it is unclear what either adds to the gen-
eral prohibition on transmission. By sending an image electronically,
someone necessarily "presents" and "exchanges" it with the recipient.
One can make the same argument with respect to the "posting" of the
image. This superfluity likely explains why "posting" is generally ex-
cluded as a separate category of prohibited conduct.
However, this exclusion is a mistake. Because "posting" suggests
broader third-party access than transmission to a single cell phone or e-
mail account, including it as a separate category of conduct seems wise to
remind adolescents of the dangers inherent in placing a compromising
image in cyberspace. Even if a photo is originally posted for private view-
ing by one party, its placement in a domain frequented by others in-
troduces a heightened risk of future access by third parties. We have
already discussed, in this regard, the tragedy that befell Beth, the Georgia
teenager who posted nude photos of herself in a chat room when she was
fourteen. Those photos surfaced three years later and ended up in the
mailboxes of her high school classmates.' 77 The delay was even longer
with Matthew Bean's victim.17 8 The teenager was seventeen when Bean
sent naked photos of him, taken four to five years earlier, to teachers and
administrators at the victim's high school.' 79
The final conduct issue relevant to sexting is consent. North Dakota's
law, as amended in 2011, prohibits the creation and possession of sexts
only if their production was surreptitious "[w]ithout written consent from
each individual who has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the im-
172. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b(a)(2).
173. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309(C) (Supp. 2012) (West) (in lieu of attempting to
destroy the image, minor may notify a parent, guardian, the police, or a school official);
TEX. PENAL CODE AN. § 43.261(f)(1) (West Supp. 2013); S.B. 277, 76th Reg. Sess. (Nev.
2011) (adopted on June 3, 2011).
174. FLA. STAT. § 847.0141(1)(b) (2012).
175. S.B. 179, 2011 Leg., 86th Sess. (S.D. 2011).
176. None of the other initiatives include "presenting" and only Ohio's proposed stat-
ute mentions "exchang[ing.]" See H.B. 53, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011).
177. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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age." 180 Similar legislation is currently pending in Pennsylvania1 81 and
Kentucky.182 By virtue of its involuntary nature, this sort of misconduct
differs from that of typical sexting cases where the victim knowingly cre-
ates and transmits the sexual image.'83 Because the two contexts are
meaningfully distinct, it is not surprising that sexting statutes generally do
not address surreptitious creation, possession, and distribution. To this
end, North Dakota's statute addresses only involuntary conduct while
Pennsylvania's proposed separate law-one concerning sexting, and the
other, discussed here-created the offense of "[c]yberbullying by
minors." 184
C. STATE OF MIND
All anti-sexting laws contain state of mind requirements. The most
common is "knowingly," which requires the prosecutor to prove that the
defendant knew that he or she was transmitting or was in possession of a
sexually explicit image of a minor.'8 Guam is unique in allowing liability
based on recklessness, 8 6 whereas North Dakota requires "willful[ness]"
for possession.'87
Several statutes specify a more malevolent state of mind. For example,
in North Dakota, Alaska, and California, proof of intent to humiliate or
harass is necessary for liability.188 Conversely, in Texas, the "intent to
harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass or offend" subjects the
defendant to a higher-level offense.189 Because these provisions require
evil motive, they focus squarely on those individuals who disseminate sex-
180. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-03.3(l)(a) (2012).
181. Passed by the Pennsylvania Senate, the bill creates criminal liability when a minor,
without consent, "photographs, videotapes, depicts on a computer or films" another minor
"in a state of nudity" or "transmits, distributes, publishes or disseminates" the "visual de-
piction" so created. S.B. 850, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011).
182. Passed by the Kentucky House, this proposal would expand the definition of the
crime of "voyeurism" by adding computers and cell phones to the list of electronic devices
that may not be used to record a sexually explicit image of another person without his or
her consent. H.B. 126, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011).
183. It is more akin to the actions of Dharun Ravi, the New Jersey college students who
secretly recorded and then streamed on the internet a sexual encounter between his room-
mate and another man. See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
184. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1)(a); S.B. 850, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2011).
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 847.0141(1) (2012) (knowingly); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-
1.4(b) (2012) (knowingly); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.261(b) (West Supp. 2013) (inten-
tionally or knowingly); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012)
(knowingly).
186. See 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 28.100(a) (2012). Under Guam's culpability standards,
derived from the Model Penal Code, a person is reckless with respect to the result of his
conduct when he is aware "of a substantial risk . .. that his conduct will cause [that] result"
and unjustifiably disregards that risk, which "constitutes a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." Id. § 4.30(c) (2012).
187. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1)(a).
188. Id. § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1)(b) ("intent to cause emotional harm or humiliation"); H.B.
127, 27th Leg., First Sess. (Alaska 2011) ("intent to annoy or humiliate"); S.B. 919, 2011
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (as amended, June 2011) (intent to "humiliate or harass").
189. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.261(c) (Class C versus Class B misdemeanor).
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ually explicit images to cause emotional harm to the person(s) pictured
therein. To that end, in its findings of fact accompanying the sexting bill,
California notes that involvement in sexting subjects students to "long-
term social, emotional, and psychological harms as a result of harassment
and bullying." 190
There are certainly instances of cyberabuse that began with a sext, vol-
untarily created by a minor, which is subsequently sent to another minor
with whom the sender was or hoped to be in an intimate relationship. 191
For example, when Alex Phillips's sixteen-year-old girlfriend sent him na-
ked pictures, she never imagined that, months later, angry over their
break-up, he would post them on the internet with the caption "You tell
me this bitch duserves [sic] this!!!!!!!"1 9 2 Nor could fourteen-year-old
Margarite have imagined that a topless photo she sent to a classmate
whom she liked would find its way into the mailboxes of countless stran-
gers when, after the break-up, the boy sent it to a girl in their class who
hated Margarite.193
Conditioning liability on distribution of the sext with an intent to cause
emotional or psychological distress will, at the same time, exclude other
sexting cyberbullies. Predators like Anthony Stancl, who coerced numer-
ous teenage boys into engaging in sex acts, often only threaten to send the
sexually explicit images to third parties; they never actually carry out the
threats. 194 Even if they did, their intent was not, strictly speaking, to hu-
miliate or harass their victims. Rather, it was to generate fear so that the
boys they targeted would comply with their demands.195
In the end, the fact that Anthony Standl and others like him may be
beyond the reach of some anti-sexting statutes is no cause for concern.
These defendants typically face a host of serious criminal charges that
adequately address the gravity of their criminal behavior. Such substan-
tial penalties stand in stark contrast to those specified in the sexting stat-
utes. While sexting sanctions vary, they are generally modest, in
recognition of the fact that "[c]hildren often act without fully contemplat-
ing the . . . consequences of their actions."196 Accordingly, legislators are
endeavoring to deter future misconduct without creating a record that
may compromise future educational and job prospects.
190. S.B. 919, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). In its sexting law, New Jersey likewise
noted "the possible connection between bullying and cyber-bullying and juveniles sharing
sexually suggestive or explicit materials." N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:4A-71.1(b)(4) (West Supp.
2013).
191. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying notes.
192. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying notes.
193. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying notes.
194. See supra notes 53-55, text accompanying, and text accompanying notes 80-82.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
196. Preamble, S.B. 277, 76th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2011) (adopted on June 3, 2011).
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D. PENALTIES 1 9 7
Recognizing the failure of adolescents to appreciate the potential long-
term harm associated with sexting, several statutes allow minors who
commit sexting offenses to complete an educational program in lieu of
criminal prosecution. Most impose content requirements to that end, re-
quiring instruction on the consequences of sharing sexually "suggestive"
or "explicit" materials, including the "loss of educational and employ-
ment opportunities[ ] and being barred or removed from school programs
and extracurricular activities."1 9 8 If a minor successfully completes the
program, some states expunge all records relating to his or her offense.199
While not quite as generous to juvenile offenders, many other laws also
provide alternatives to criminal prosecution. In a novel approach, Califor-
nia would not involve the courts at all. Its proposal assigns school districts
the responsibility for investigating and responding sexting allegations that
are "related to school activity or attendance." 2 0 0 After investigating spe-
cific complaints, superintendents and principals would have the authority,
based on their findings, to suspend or expel students for their
misconduct.201
Statutes in other jurisdictions operate outside the school system. Sev-
eral specify noncriminal sanctions, often supervised by family courts.202
The most permissive declare certain offenders to be2 0 3 minors "in need of
supervision,"204 and order counseling and other supportive services to ad-
dress their misconduct.205 Others deem the minor guilty of a noncriminal
197. Some of the statutes also apply to adults who possess or transmit sexually explicit
images of minors. This article does not address those provisions.
198. 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 28.100 (g)(2)-(4) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-
71.1(b)(2) (West Supp. 2013); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 458-l(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2012).
Florida also authorizes participation in "suitable training or instruction" as the penalty for
first-time offenders without specifying the requisite content of any such program. FLA.
STAT. § 847.0141(3)(a) (2012); see also H.B. 815, 195th Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2011) (allowing
adjudication alternatives "appropriate to the circumstances").
199. See, e.g., 9 GUAM CODE. ANN. § 28.100(g)(2); H.B. 815 § (2)(d), 195th Gen. As-
semb. (Pa. 2011).
200. This standard incorporates conduct that occurs on school grounds, during school-
sponsored activities, when travelling to or from school, and during lunch whether on or off
campus. S.B. 919 § 5(t), 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (as amended June 28, 2011).
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-1.4(c) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,§ 2802b(b)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 2012); H.B. 573, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(5) (Haw. 2011).
203. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1.1(C)(1) (2012) (any offender responsible for trans-
mitting a sexual image of himself or herself); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.737(4)(a)(1)
(West Supp. 2013) (any first-time offender responsible for transmitting a sexual image of
himself or herself).
204. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 / § 3-40(c) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:81.1.1(C)(1) (family "in need of services" under Title VII of the Louisiana Children's
Code); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.737(4)(a)(1) ("child in need of supervision").
205. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 / § 3-40(d) (allowing court to order supportive
services, including counseling, as well as community service); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
779 (2004 & Supp. 2012) (giving the court broad authority to order available community-
based services, including psychological treatment); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62E.410(1)(c) (juve-




"violation" 206 or impose a finding of delinquency. 207 In certain states, the
records pertaining to the delinquency adjudication are subject to ex-
pungement when the minor turns eighteen. 208
While indicative of a desire for restraint in punishing minors for sexting
violations, the foregoing does not constitute a rejection of the criminal
law in this context. In fact, many statutes provide criminal penalties, ei-
ther exclusively or in combination with civil remedies. Where criminal, a
minor's first sexting violation is usually no greater than a misdemeanor or
"petty offense." 209 However, in most jurisdictions, the severity of the
sanction increases for subsequent violations. While later offenses usually
do not exceed the misdemeanor level,210 some statutes allow felony con-
victions. 211 Some also adjust the penalty in light of the egregiousness of
the act. This determination considers the nature of the conduct,212 the
actor's state of mind,213 and the number of recipients.214
E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Negotiating the torturous path of the numerous and varied anti-sexting
statutes-enacted, pending, and proposed-allows certain conclusions.
First, legislative interest is decidedly focused on minors. Lawmakers seem
content, for the most part, to allow prosecution of adult sexters under
existing child pornography and obscenity statutes which classify most of-
fenses as felonies.215 Likewise, sexting laws that include adults tend to
assign significantly harsher penalties to them than to minors for the same
206. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 847.0141(3)(a) (2012); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.060
(West 2006).
207. See, e.g., 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 28.100(d) (2012) ("status offense," meaning "a
delinquent act"); NEV. REV. STAT, ANN. § 200.737(5)(a) (West Supp. 2013) (transmission
or distribution of sexual image of another minor); VT. STAT. tit. 13, § 2802b(b)(1); H.B.
3130, 119th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011) (as amended, Mar. 7, 2012).
208. VT. STAT. tit. 13, § 2802b(b)(4); H.B. 573, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011).
209. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309(D), (E) (Supp. 2012) (West) (petty of-
fense or class 3 misdemeanor); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-196h(c) (2012) (class A
misdemeanor).
210. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.261(c)(1)(B), (c)(2), (d)(1) (West Supp.
2013); H.B. 126, Reg. Sess. §§ 2(4), 5(7) (Ky. 2011).
211. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 84 7.0141(3)(c) (felony of the third degree for third viola-
tion); VT. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 2802b(3), 2827(c)(1) (Second violation can result in incarcera-
tion for up to two years for "sexual exploitation of children.").
212. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1.1(C)(1) (Supp. 2012) (harsher sanction for
possession and transmission to third party than transmitting sexual image of self); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.737(4), (5) (harsher sanction for transmitting sexual image of third party
versus oneself).
213. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-03.3(1)-(2) (2012) ("[I]ntent to cause emotional
harm or humiliation" is higher-level misdemeanor); TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.261(c)(1)(A)
(mandating that intent to "harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass or offend" con-
verts Class C misdemeanor to Class B).
214. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-309(D), (E) (converting petty offense into a misde-
meanor for display of visual image to more than one party).
215. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-813.01(2) (2012) (stating that adults who "know-
ingly possess any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct" involving minors commit a
felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206(1), (2)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2013) (stating that
adults who deal in "material harmful to a minor" commit a felony).
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conduct, often designating the adults' offenses as felonies.216
With respect to conduct, all statutes prohibit the transmission of sexual
images. But, while dissemination to third parties is usually the catalyst for
tragedy, the statutes often apply equally to the initial transmission by the
creator of the sext. Because "possession" is also pervasively included, the
intended recipient is also liable. Some states provide an affirmative de-
fense to possession but, to qualify, the recipient generally must have at-
tempted to delete the sext or reported it to an authority figure. Therefore,
in a typical sexting scenario, where a teenage boy retains on his cell
phone a sext sent by his girlfriend, the defense would be unavailable.
The state of mind requirement, included in virtually all of the anti-sext-
ing initiatives, provides little protection for charged minors. Proof that an
individual acted "knowingly," the most common requirement, will not
trouble prosecutors since logic suggests that minors are rarely unaware
that they are sending or possessing a sexually explicit image. Establishing
"intentional" or "willful" conduct is not problematic for the same reason,
unless the intent must be to "humiliate" or "harass." Using this more
malicious mental state shrinks the law's reach. Relatively few states have
embraced it, perhaps because it would exempt too many sexting partici-
pants. Even where this standard exists, its associated penalty is not very
stringent, ranging from expulsion from school to a misdemeanor convic-
tion. In Texas, for example, an intent to "abuse" or "torment" merely
enhances the offense level from a Class C to a Class B misdemeanor,
which adds up to 180 days of confinement and $1,500 in fines. 217
To draw so little distinction between teenagers who voluntarily send
and receive sexts of each other while dating and those who broadly dis-
seminate sexual images of a third party to cause that person significant
emotional harm seems unjust. It reflects, however, a general agreement
among the states that low-level sanctions are appropriate for all sexting
offenses, regardless of context. Thus, in states that impose stricter penal-
ties for the transmission of a third-party image versus that of oneself, the
sanction remains fairly modest. Even repeat offenders very rarely face
anything greater than misdemeanor liability.
V. THE ROAD TO SEXTING
Based on the foregoing, most would argue that the anti-sexting craze
has produced an unprincipled, and often misguided, morass of laws.2 18 To
216. See, e.g., VT. STAT. tit. 13, § 2802b(b), (c) (delinquency adjudication for minor; jail
time of up to six months for adult); H.B. 573, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(5) (Haw. 2011)
(family court adjudication for minor; felony for adult); H.B. 126, Reg. Sess. §§ 4, 5, 11 (Ky.
2011) (felony for adult; "violation" for minor). But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-
03.3(1), (2) (same misdemeanor liability for all persons).
217. TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 12.22, 12.23.
218. While the depth and content of criticism varies, commentators have uniformly
found fault with the legislative treatment of sexting. See, e.g., Catherine Arcabascio, Sext-
ing and Teenagers: OMG R U Going 2 Jail?, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2010); Henry F.
Fradella & Marcus A. Galeste, Sexting: The Misguided Penal Social Control of Teenage
Sexual Behavior in the Digital Age, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 438 (2011); Mary Graw Leary, Sext-
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the extent that we attempt to justify these initiatives solely by their rela-
tionship to cognizable harms gleaned from documented cases, this seems
a fair, if not inevitable, conclusion. Sexting legislation does not exist, how-
ever, in a historical vacuum. The state has prosecuted consensual sexual
activity for hundreds of years through the crime of statutory rape. Next,
we will consider this evolutionary progression to see if it offers an expla-
nation for the legislative frenzy surrounding sexting.
A. THE ORIGINS OF STATUTORY RAPE
First codified into English law in 1275, the offense of statutory rape
prohibited sexual relations with females under the age of twelve.219 While
the desire to shield pre-pubescent girls from the sexual intentions of men
seems unimpeachable, the law supported an equally powerful financial
motivation. Because the loss of chastity compromised girls' marital pros-
pects, fathers had a vested interest in ensuring their daughters' purity to
avoid a greatly diminished dowry or, worse yet, no marriage at all. 22 0 In
an era when females were considered property, first of their fathers and
then of their husbands, chastity was a precious commodity and those who
stole it deserved punishment.221
Statutory rape in the United States initially mirrored that of the En-
glish common law.2 2 2 During the nineteenth century, however, the age of
consent rose dramatically and averaged sixteen by the early twentieth
century. 223 The Women's Christian Temperance Movement and its allies
were instrumental in this effort, motivated by sharp increases in the num-
ber of females entering the workplace through industrialization. Joined
by "Social Purity" reformers, female activists believed that working girls
needed protection from "manipulative men" who would seduce them,
bringing disgrace to their families and compromising the girls' marital
prospects. 224 Removing "the presumption of permissible seduction" 225 by
raising the age of consent was the only way to change male sexual behav-
ing or Self-Produced Child Pornography? The Dialog Continues-Structured Prosecutorial
Discretion Within a Multidisciplinary Response, 17 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 486 (2010);
Lawrence G. Walters, How to Fix the Sexting Problem: An Analysis of the Legal and Policy
Considerations for Sexting Legislation, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 98 (2010).
219. Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 757, 762 n.35 (1980) (citing Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13 (Eng.)
("[TJhe King prohibiteth that none do ravish, nor take away with force, any Maiden within
Age.")).
220. See Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master's House: Of Protection, Patriarchy and
the Potential for Using the Master's Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL
L. REv. 799, 802-03 (2000) [hereinafter Oberman, Girls in the Master's House].
221, Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 494-95 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
222. CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT. THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES 10-11 (2004).
223. Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn at Last": Rape Reform in Late Nine-
teenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (1997).
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ior and shield females from "cultural values that threatened their well-
being." 22 6
Ironically, the campaign to raise the age of consent in the United States
and England brought together two groups not accustomed to working
together: feminists and "repressive moralists." 227 While their motivations
were quite different, 2 2 8 the two groups shared a general recognition that
sexuality is "a vehicle of power that in complex ways has kept women
subordinated in society." 2 2 9 Accordingly, both wanted to protect naive
adolescent girls from male sexual coercion and exploitation. In providing
a means to this end, statutory rape laws served both a protective and a
patriarchal function.2 30
B. STATUTORY RAPE IN THE 20TH CENTURY
The twentieth century saw decreased enthusiasm for enforcing statu-
tory rape laws. By the 1920s, as progressives replaced social purists, the
image of the vulnerable adolescent girl was replaced by that of the seduc-
tress, preying upon married men and their families. 231 This change engen-
dered a corresponding shift in state-sponsored programs from
prosecution of men to education of female "sexual delinquents." 2 3 2 The
1935 introduction of federal funding for fatherless children in need of
financial assistance promoted this change in perception. Whereas almost
half of the recipients were widows in the program's early years,233 by the
early 1960s they were replaced by women who were abandoned, di-
vorced, or never married. 234
During this mid-twentieth century period, the principal originators of
information regarding statutory rapes were welfare agencies in search of
"deadbeat dads" who had failed to provide child support to the underage
women whose children they fathered.235 As prosecutors decided whether
to file criminal charges against the adult male, local law enforcement
often referred the underage mother to juvenile authorities, believing her
226. Larson, supra note 223, at 4.
227. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 387, 403 (1984).
228. For example, the social purity movement warned of "undifferentiated male lust,"
while the feminists complained of gender-based double standards and the general hostility
of the law towards women. Judith R. Walkowitz, The Politics of Prostitution, 6 SIGNS 123,
129, 131 (1980) (quoting JEFFREY WEEKS, COMING Our: HOMOSEXUAL POLITICS IN BRIT-
AIN FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 18 (1977)).
229. Larson, supra note 223, at 4.
230. Oberman, Girls in the Master's House, supra note 220, at 803.
231. Levine, supra note 224, at 1062-63.
232. Steven Schlossman & Stephanie Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Fe-
male Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48 HARV. EDu. REV. 65, 72 (1978).
233. GwENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD: INEQUALITY IN THE WEL-
FARE STATE, 1917-1942, at 143, 175 (1995).
234. MIMI ABRAMOVITz, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POL-
ICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 321 (1988).
235. Levine, supra note 224, at 1067-68.
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to be at risk "of leading an 'idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life.'" 236 No
longer the vulnerable innocent depicted by social purists half a century
earlier, statutory rape victims were now undisciplined delinquents, de-
pendent on public funds, and in need of oversight and rehabilitation to
become righteous and productive members of society.
The advent of the sexual revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s re-
moved the taboos associated with premarital sex and the denigration of
those whose pregnancy exemplified it. Best-selling books celebrated sex-
ual intercourse, openly embracing female sexuality and sexual satisfaction
for the first time.237 As attitudes towards sex changed, states modified
statutory rape laws to reflect new public sensibilities. Most made the
crime gender-neutral with respect to perpetrators and victims. At the
same time, they required a specific difference in age between defendants
and their younger victims. 23 8 Some lowered the age of consent,239 while
many adjusted the penalty based on the age of the victim, the perpetra-
tor,240 or both.241
As legal standards changed, the enforcement of statutory rape laws be-
came somewhat "sporadic[ ]" until the end of the twentieth century, when
236. Id. at 1069 (quoting J. Richard Woodworth, The Administration of Statutory Rape
Complaints: A Sociological Study (1964) (unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkley)).
237. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RE-
SPONSE (1966); DAVID R. REUBEN, EVERYTHING YOU WANTED TO KNow ABOUT SEX:
BUT WERF AFRAID TO ASK (1969).
238. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:80 (2012) (at least two years); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAw § 3-304 (LexisNexis 2012) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1)
(West Supp. 2012) (at least four years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(b) (West Supp. 2013)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401.2(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2013) (at least ten years).
239. In this regard, a number of states impose felony liability for sexual intercourse with
very young victims, regardless of the age of the perpetrator. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.040 (West 2006) (less than twelve); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(D)(1) (West Supp.
2012) (less than thirteen); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(c) (West Supp. 2013) (same);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655(A)(1) (2013) (less than eleven); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 22-22-1
(2006 & Supp. 2012) (less than thirteen).
240. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 750.520b (West Supp. 2013) (up to life in
prison if the victim is under thirteen; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2013) (up to thirty years
if the victim is under eleven; up to twenty years if between eleven and fourteen); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 939.50, 948.02 (West 2005) (up to forty years if the victim is under thirteen;
up to twenty-five years if under sixteen).
241. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402 (West 2013) (two to six years if the
victim is under fifteen and the perpetrator is at least four years older; one to two years if
the victim is fifteen or sixteen and the perpetrator is at least ten years older); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 253(1)(B), 254(1) (2006) (up to forty years if the victim is under four-
teen; up to five years if the victim is fourteen or fifteen and the perpetrator is at least ten
years older; up to one year if the victim is fourteen or fifteen and the perpetrator is at least
five years older); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.032(1), .034(1) (West 2012) (five years to life if
the victim is under fourteen; up to seven years if the victim is under seventeen and the
perpetrator is at least twenty-one); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2005) (ten to twenty
years if the victim is under thirteen; five to ten years if the victim is thirteen to sixteen and
the perpetrator is at least four years older); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 130.30, .35 (McKinney
2009) (five to twenty-five years if the victim is under thirteen and the perpetrator is eigh-
teen or older; up to seven years if the victim is under fifteen and the perpetrator is at least
eighteen and at least four years older).
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interest sparked dramatically. 242 After a series of studies indicated that
adult men fathered a disproportionate number of babies born to teenage
mothers, 243 the federal government exhorted state and local governments
to "aggressively enforce statutory rape laws" in its comprehensive welfare
reform act in 1996.244 The following year, the American Bar Associa-
tion's Center on Children and the Law weighed in on the issue, emphasiz-
ing the impropriety of sexual relationships between girls fifteen and
younger and men twenty and older.245
Reflecting these concerns, law enforcement focused predominately on
relationships in which the perpetrator was at least ten years older than
the victim, including those where the adult male had authority over, or a
familial connection to, the victim, such as teachers, coaches, stepfathers
and mothers' boyfriends.246 This pursuit of those who prey upon much
younger, impressionable victims is commendable. At the same time, nar-
rowing the enforcement of statutory rape in this way fails to protect girls
harmed by sexual relationships with individuals closer in age who may
not occupy a special position of trust. That the risk of interpersonal ma-
nipulation may be greater with older adults, especially those whom an
adolescent respects or admires, does not suggest that sexual contact be-
tween similarly-aged teenagers is necessarily voluntary. As Michelle
Oberman aptly notes, "peers may be differently situated with respect to
their capacity to exploit others."247
One need only consider the sexual exploits of the teenage boys dubbed
"Spur Posse" in Lakewood, California, to illustrate the point. Engaged in
a competition to see who could have sexual relations with the most girls,
this band of twenty to thirty popular high school boys each had sexual
contact with "20 to 73[] girls," ranging in age from ten to sixteen. 248 The
gang had a reputation for violence and several victims told the police
"they submitted to sexual acts because they were afraid." 249 Nonetheless,
the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office concluded that there
was insufficient evidence of coercion and dropped all charges against
eight of the nine boys they had arrested. 250 This decision reflected an
242. Oberman, Girls in the Master's House, supra note 220, at 808.
243. Levine, supra note 224, at 1078-82 (discussing studies).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 14016 (2006).
245. SHARON G. ELSTEIN & Noy S. DAVIS, ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW,
SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ADULT MALES AND YOUNG TEEN GIRLS: EXPLORING
THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSES 1-5 (1997).
246. Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for
Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 703, 748 (2000) [hereinafter Oberman, Regulating Con-
sensual Sex with Minors]. During this period, a number of commentators also expressed
concern about the dangers posed by these types of perpetrators. See, e.g., ALAN W. Mc-
Evov & EDSEL L. ERICKSON, YOUTH AND EXPLOITATION (1990); STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF
LAW 168-227 (1998).
247. Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors, supra note 246, at 770.
248. Oberman, Turning Girls into Women, supra note 35, at 109 & nn.1, 3, 5.
249. Id. at 110 & n.10.
250. The victim of the sixteen-year-old charged with lewd and lascivious behavior was a
ten-year-old. Janet Wiscombe, An American Tragedy: One Spur Posse Mother Struggles to
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internal office policy against prosecuting "consensual sex between teen-
agers," even though the boys' conduct clearly established their guilt
under California law which does not require proof of coercion. 251
The Los Angeles district attorney's office is not alone in their reluc-
tance to file charges against teenagers for sexual contact with peers. In
Illinois, an individual under the age of seventeen commits criminal sexual
abuse, punishable by up to one year in prison, when he or she sexually
"penetrat[e]s" someone aged nine to seventeen.252 Notwithstanding the
breadth of this definition, a review of statutory rape data in Illinois dis-
closed that sexual intercourse in the context of a consensual, intimate re-
lationship where the parties were less than ten years apart in age
accounted for a mere 1% of all statutory rape charges, far less even than
the national average of 7%.253 A supervisory state's attorney in Chicago
was not surprised by these findings, noting the relative paucity of com-
plaints filed under these circumstanceS254 and, as in Los Angeles, a perva-
sive lack of interest in prosecuting consensual intercourse among
peers.255
C. STATUTORY RAPE AND 21ST CENTURY SENSIBILITIES
When sexting entered public consciousness in 2005,256 several states
continued to make sexual intercourse between adolescents of similar age
a criminal offense. 257 For the most part, however, district attorneys re-
mained disinterested in prosecuting consensual sex between teenagers. In
stark contrast to these prevailing norms, prosecutors in Georgia filed fel-
ony charges against seventeen-year-old Genarlow Wilson for having con-
sensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old girl at a party in 2003. Found
guilty of aggravated child molestation in February 2005,258 Wilson, a high
Understand, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-03-22/news/1s-
49810_1_spur-posse.
251. In California, sexual intercourse with someone under eighteen is a misdemeanor,
unless the perpetrator is more than three years older than the victim, in which case it can
be a felony. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(b)-(d) (West 2008).
252. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-1.50b (West 2002).
253. Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors, supra note 246, at 749.
254. She noted, in this regard, that they tend to arise only in the context of "unplanned
pregnancy, a sexually transmitted disease, physical violence, and/or parental intervention."
Id.
255. Id. at 750.
256. The term "sexting" first appeared in a 2005 newspaper article. See Yvonne Rob-
erts, The One and Only, SUNDAY TEL. MAG. (Australia), July 31, 2005, at 22, available at
2005 WLNR 12011881 ("Following a string of extramarital affairs and several lurid 'sext-
ing' episodes, Warne has found himself home alone, with Simone Warne taking their three
children and flying the conjugal coop.").
257. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (2011) (sexual intercourse with someone
under the age of sixteen); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 948.02,.09 (West 2005) (sexual intercourse
with a minor of any age).
258. Then-existing Georgia law provided that "[a] person commits the offense of aggra-
vated child molestation when such person commits an offense of child molestation which
act ... involves an act of sodomy." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4(c) (2005). Sodomy, in turn,
includes "any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another." Id. § 16-6-2(a)(1).
[Vol. 66142
Sexting: 21st Century Statutory Rape
school athlete and homecoming king, received a ten-year prison sentence
with no opportunity for parole, in accordance with statutory require-
ments.259 His conviction would also require him to register as a sex of-
fender upon his release.260
Newspaper editorialS 261 and national news media 262 assailed Wilson's
treatment while public figures, outraged at the severity of Wilson's sen-
tence, pledged their support. To secure Wilson's release while his habeas
corpus appeal was pending, "[elleven businessmen[] offered to post a $1
million cash bond." 263 Georgia state senators, joined by the pastor of the
historic Ebenezer Baptist Church, hand-delivered letters to the office of
the governor, urging him to intervene in the case.2M And President
Jimmy Carter, a lifelong Georgia resident and former governor, person-
ally wrote to the state attorney general urging him to void Wilson's con-
viction due to the extremely unjust nature of the punishment.265
On October 26, 2007, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated Wilson's
sentence, finding that it was "grossly disproportionate to [the] crime"
and, as such, "constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment under both the
Georgia and [U.S.] Constitutions." 2 6 6 The justices ordered his immediate
release from custody.267 Hours later, after more than two years behind
bars,268 Wilson was set free.
That Wilson's ten-year sentence was considered so excessive as to con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment underscores the sharp limits that
presently exist nationally on the criminalization of consensual sexual be-
havior between adolescents of similar age. Under the so-called "Romeo
and Juliet" exception, sexual conduct between minors is criminal in most
states only if there is a significant age difference between the perpetrator
259. At that time, aggravated child molestation required incarceration "for not less
than ten nor more than [thirty] years," without the possibility of parole. Id. § 16-6-4(d)(1),
§ 1.
260. Id. § 42-1-12. In addition, as a sex offender, Wilson could not live or work within
1,000 feet of any child care facility, church, or area where minors congregate. Id. § 42-1-15.
261. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Blinded by the Law: Teen Sex Case Shows that Focusing on
the Letter of the Law Doesn't Always Spell Justice, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 2007, at 1; Maureen
Downey, Editorial, OUR OPINION: Teen's Search for Justice, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June
8, 2007, at A14; Editorial, Georgia's Shame, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 2007, at A20.
262. See, e.g., Genarlow Wilson: Plea Deal Would Have Left Me Without a Home, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/10/29/wilson.released/ (last updated Oct. 29, 2007,
11:30pm); Outrage After Teen Gets 10 Years for Oral Sex with Girl, ABC PRIMETIME (Feb.
7, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/LegalCenter/story?id=1693362; Primetime Live:
Teen Sex Tape; Outrage After Teen Gets 10 Years For Oral Sex (ABC News Transcripts
Mar. 9, 2006) (statement of Chris Cuomo).
263. Brenda Goodman, Georgia: Supporters Offer Bond for Prisoner, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 2007, at A15.
264. Carlos Campos, Governor Is Urged to Step In, ATLANTA J.-CONsT., June 6, 2007,
at Bl.
265. Jeremy Redmon, Sex Landed Him in Prison: Will Petition Bail Him Out?, Ar-
LANTA J.-CONST., June 6, 2007, at Al.
266. Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501, 510 (Ga. 2007).
267. Id. at 511.




and the victim. 2 6 9 In other jurisdictions, closeness in age operates as a
mitigating factor. For example, in 2006, Georgia reclassified Genarlow
Wilson's conduct as a misdemeanor since he was less than four years
older than his victim. 270
Moreover, as discussed previously, prosecutors are reluctant to charge
teenagers who have sex with other teens even when they have the author-
ity-both legally and morally-to do S0.271 Consider the Spur Posse
case.2 72 Unlike most sexual contact between teenagers, these acts did not
take place in the context of an ongoing, intimate relationship.273 The girls
were merely conquests, quick encounters designed to facilitate the ac-
crual of "points." 274 "We tell a girl," one gang member commented, "we
don't want to waste time romancing."275 Sometimes this lack of affection
became even more insidious, involving degradation and cruelty that call
into question the voluntariness of the victim's participation.276 In one
such instance, a group of boys who had taken a girl's clothing refused to
return it until she had sex with them. They relented only when she cried
for help.277
The Spur Posse's own account of what transpired would have arguably
justified the filing of forcible rape charges, at least with respect to certain
incidents. Instead, the district attorney did not file any charges against
seven of the eight boys, even though California is one of a minority of
jurisdictions without a Romeo and Juliet exception to its statutory rape
law.2 7 8 The lone prosecution involved sexual contact between a sixteen-
year-old boy and a ten-year-old girl, the youngest victim. 2 7 9 Sadly, the
sexual abuse of an eleven-year-old who had been the first to speak pub-
licly about her ordeal was considered insufficiently egregious to merit
269. See ASAPH GLOSSER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., STATU-
TORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 8 (2004), availa-
ble at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/SR/StateLaws/; Meredith Cohen, No Child Left Behind
Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16
J.L. & POL'Y 717, 722, 734 & n.118 (2008).
270. Under the 2006 statutory amendment, a person commits the crime of misde-
meanor aggravated child molestation by engaging in sodomy with a victim who "is at least
13 but less than 16 years of age," provided the perpetrator is "18 years of age or younger
and is no more than four years older than the victim." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4(d)(2)
(West 2009) (amended 2006); see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.440(A) (2010) (at least three
years ); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:80 (2012) (at least two years); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAw § 3-304(6) (LexisNexis 2012) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (West Supp.
2012) (at least four years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a) (West Supp. 2013) (same).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 252-55.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 248-51.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 248-51.
274. David Ferrell, 8 High School Students Held in Rape, Assault Case, L.A. TIMEs,
Mar. 19, 1993, at Al.
275. SUSAN FALUDI, THE LOST Boys, as reprinted in GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 1999, availa-
ble at http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/1999/sep/06/features11.g2.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 248-51.
277. Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women, supra note 35, at 17 & n.15.
278. FALUDI, supra note 275.
279. Id.
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criminal action.280 Emboldened by the acquiescence of the district attor-
ney's office, neither their arrest nor public scrutiny of their conduct hum-
bled the Spur Posse.281 On the contrary, they savaged their victims in
interviews, referring to them as "whores" who complained after-the-fact
because they were embarrassed by what they had done. 282
D. SEXTING HYSTERIA
The previous section makes clear that interest in punishing consensual
sexual behavior between adolescents has been at an extremely low ebb
for at least twenty years. The avoidance of such cases is commonplace
and accepted, so much that the publicly-elected district attorney of Los
Angeles County refused to file potential charges against the Spur Posse in
1997 when state law favored prosecution and national media had given
voice to young victims. 28 3 When a Georgia prosecutor challenged these
norms by charging a teenager in accordance with state law in 2003, both
the public and the state's highest court repudiated his efforts, declaring
the teenager's sentence "cruel and unusual."284
With researchers reporting in 1998 that fifty percent of adolescents had
engaged in sexual intercourse by the age of sixteen,285 law enforcement's
general indifference to teenage sexuality seems a sensible reaction to
changes in social mores. Since twenty-first century adolescents live in a
digital cyberworld, it seems equally logical that permissive attitudes to-
wards sexual relations would find expression through electronic media;
sexting is simply the inevitable expression of that synergy. Accordingly,
one would expect the same sort of acquiescence by public officials to con-
sensual sexting that presently exists for statutory rape. Nothing, of course,
could be further from the truth.
Unsurprisingly, this national "war on sexting" has engendered wide-
spread criticism. Commentators have assailed the application of child
pornography laws in this context28 6 and condemned new laws targeting
sexting on a variety of fronts, including overbreadth;287 unbridled
280. Somini Sengupta, Spur Posse Victim Speaks Out to Encourage Others, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1993, at B3.
281. Id.
282. Ferrell, supra note 274.
283. Sengupta, supra note 280.
284. See supra text accompanying 266-67.
285. Charles W. Warren et al., Sexual Behavior Among U.S. High School Students,
1990-1995, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 170, 170-71 (1998). While more recent data reports a
lower percentage, there is no doubt that a significant minority of teenagers are sexually
active.
286. Marsha Levick & Kristina Moon, Prosecuting Sexting as Child Pornography: A
Critique, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2010); Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child
Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 505, 520, 544
(2008); Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Comment, When Sex and Cell Phones Collide:
Inside the Prosecution of a Teen Sexting Case, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 34-39
(2009).
287. Eric S. Latzer, Comment, The Search for a Sensible Sexting Solution: A Call for
Legislative Action, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1039, 1067-68 (2011) (advocating differential
treatment of consensual and nonconsensual sexting); see also Megan Myers, Technology
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prosecutorial discretion;288 the stigmatization of youth;289 excessive pun-
ishment;290 and interference with fundamental constitutional rights.291
Reflecting the decidedly negative reaction to sexting initiatives, scholar-
ship in this area has focused on resolving these problems and providing a
uniform,292 balanced response to youthful sexual indiscretion. 293
These remedial proposals proceed from a common belief that some
provisions in anti-sexting laws are too tenuously linked to the harms that
flow from this activity. Among the most frequently cited statutory ex-
cesses are the imposition of serious sanctions, such as sex offender regis-
tration, and the inclusion of "lovebirds" who only exchange sexually
explicit images of themselves. Critics have also lodged normative objec-
tions, arguing in particular that criminal sanctions are inappropriate for
behavior consistent with healthy adolescent development. 294 Noting the
present disinclination to prosecute consensual adolescent sexual activity
as statutory rape, Megan Myers concludes that, because victimization
does not result from a teenager's creation and transmission of a sext to
only one other person, such conduct "is not worthy of a criminal
sanction. "295
While several of the changes proposed by Myers and others seem sensi-
ble, 2 9 6 the suggestion that the prosecution of consensual sexting is some
sort of arbitrary anachronism misses the mark. A more coherent picture
and Teen Sex: The Need for Legislative Action in Response to "Sexting," 46 TULSA L. REV.
191, 219 (2010) (distinguishing teens who produce and send sexts to one person from those
who transmit it to others to "exploit and ridicule" the creator).
288. W. Jesse Weins & Todd C. Hiestand, Sexting, Statutes, and Saved by the Bell: Intro-
ducing a Lesser Juvenile Charge with an "Aggravating Factors" Framework, 77 TENN. L.
REV. 1, 47-48 (2009).
289. Fradella & Galeste, supra note 218 (raising First and Fourteenth Amendment con-
cerns relating to free expression, self-determination, privacy, and autonomy); Walters,
supra note 218, at 125-26 (arguing that sexting laws turn teens into "branded criminals"
who will be unable to find gainful employment and form meaningful friendships and inti-
mate relationships).
290. Leary, supra note 218, at 515-20 (arguing against mandatory sentencing minimums
and sex offender registration for minors engaged in sexting); Stephanie Gaylord Forbes,
Note, Sex, Cells and SORNA: Applying Sex Offender Registration Laws to Sexting Cases,
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1741 (2011) (arguing that consensual sexting should not
result in sex offender registration).
291. Pavia, supra note 15, at 198-200 (discussing parental rights regarding the upbring-
ing of their children and the right to privacy in matters of sexual intimacy).
292. Some have proposed model legislation. See, e.g., Weins & Hiestand, supra note
288, at 48-55; Latzer, supra note 287, at 1063-69.
293. Some believe, for example, that the filing of criminal charges for sexting is never
appropriate. See Levick & Moon, supra note 286, at 1051; Richards & Calvert, supra note
286, at 37-38. Others would allow it, but only for those who distribute images to third
parties involuntarily. See Fradella & Galeste, supra note 218 (adding a further requirement
of "intent to harm, embarrass, harass, humiliate, or demean the person pictured in the
image"); Myers, supra note 287, at 219 (advocating "whatever punishment the state deems
fit" for those who transmit the sexted image to multiple parties to exploit or ridicule its
creator).
294. Fradella & Galeste, supra note 218; Levick & Moon, supra note 225, at 1035-36.
295. Myers, supra note 287, at 217.
296. For example, requiring individuals who commit sexting violations to register as sex
offenders seems disproportionate on its face, as does the imposition of felony liability in
the absence of aggravating circumstances, such as "sextortion." Id. at 209, 212.
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emerges if we view sexting through a broad, historical lens that looks past
the Spur Posse and the public condemnation of the Genarlow Wilson
case. In an era where technological innovation has fundamentally altered
patterns of communication and undermined privacy, the campaign
against sexting attempts to safeguard vulnerable youth, particularly fe-
males, from novel and potentially dangerous forms of sexual expression.
The protectionism and paternalism that fueled the enforcement of statu-
tory rape laws in the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries have returned in
the 21st.
VI. PAST AS PROLOGUE: PROTECTIONISM REVISITED
Because adolescents lack maturity in judgment, prosecutors have relied
on statutory rape laws to shield them from sexual exploitation and coer-
cion by unscrupulous individuals who might cause them harm.2 9 7 This
protection has been especially important for teenage girls due to the risk
of pregnancy. 298 Their age-related impulsivity fuels sexual risk-taking and
the failure to take proper precautions.299 Teenage girls' association of
contraceptive use and promiscuity further frustrates the exercise of good
judgment in this context.300 In sum, teenage girls face unique and
"profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual
activity." 301
Sexting can also be dangerous for unwary adolescents, especially
girls.302 However, whereas statutory rape laws target only the victim's
sexual partner, anti-sexting statutes include a range of participants in the
proscribed behavior. To evaluate the protective function of sexting sanc-
tions appropriately, we must distinguish these individuals from each
other, addressing how each individual's conduct contributes to the poten-
tial harms.
A. NONCONSENSUAL DISTRIBUTION To THIRD PARTIES
Punishing individuals who distribute sexually explicit images of others
non-consensually clearly implicates protectionist principles. As the Lo-
gan, Witsell, and Phillips cases tragically illustrate, serious emotional and
psychological harm is virtually inevitable for the adolescent subject of the
297. Lisa T. McElroy, Sex on the Brain: Adolescent Psychosocial Science and Sanctions
for Risky Sex, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 708, 714 n.21 (2010).
298. Id. at 740.
299. See id. at 714-17 (discussing adolescents' tendency to engage in risky sexual behav-
ior that produces negative consequences).
300. Deborah L. Rhode, Adolescent Pregnancy and Public Policy, in THE PoLrICs OF
PREGNANCY: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 316 (Annette Lawson &
Deborah L. Rhode eds., 1993).
301. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1981). Research-
ers have also reported that the earlier adolescents engage in sexual intercourse, the more
likely they are to experience force or coercion in a sexual encounter. Patricia Donovan,
Can Statutory Rape Laws Be Effective in Preventing Adolescent Pregnancy?, 29 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 30, 30 (1997).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 22-35.
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disseminated image. It is not surprising, therefore, that all statutes, both
enacted and proposed, target persons who engage in this sort of miscon-
duct. While the breadth of anti-sexting initiatives varies, widespread
agreement over the importance of deterring online harassment and bully-
ing makes inclusion of nonconsensual third-party distribution critical.303
B. POSSESSION OF A SEXUALLY EXPLICIT IMAGE
It is common for sexting statutes to prohibit the possession of a sext,
even if the possessor was the intended recipient. Possession implicates
protectionist principles if the possessor acquired the image coercively.
Compulsion may be overt, such as threatening to do something that
would humiliate or embarrass the sender if he or she does not comply. In
the context of an intimate relationship, however, coercion is likely to be
more oblique and gender-specific. In the Sex and Tech Survey, only girls
reported that they had been pressured personally to sext3 4 while more
than half of all respondents listed "pressure from a guy" as a reason that
girls sext in general.305 These data suggest that, although a boy's conduct
may not constitute coercion as a matter of law,3 0 6 an adolescent girl's
acquiescence to his request 307 for a sexually explicit photo may be less
voluntary than it seems. But, because possession does not require proof
of coercion, the boyfriend is guilty just the same.
By prosecuting male adolescents who persuade female peers to engage
in "consensual" sexual activity, anti-sexting laws achieve implicitly, and
perhaps unintentionally, what statutory rape laws have not: recognition of
the imbalance of power in sexual negotiation between the sexes. This in-
equity is a function of adolescent girls' greater psychological vulnerability
303. Noting that sexting is "an extremely complex issue," The National Center for Miss-
ing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) acknowledges that providing guidance to law en-
forcement is challenging. Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Policy Statement on
Sexting, NEWS & EVENTS (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/
NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=ENUS&Pageld=4130. They recommend the use of
a "severity scale," informed by some fourteen factors, to determine accountability in each
case and whether the imposition of criminal sanctions is warranted. Id. Notwithstanding
this general difficulty in line-drawing, the NCMEC identifies two scenarios as depicting
"clearly illegal" conduct. Id. One involves a quid pro quo wherein a junior boy tells a
freshman girl who wants to go to the prom that he will take her only if she first sends him a
partially nude photo, which she does. Id. The second involves nonconsensual third party
transmission: A disgruntled teenage girl, upset that her boyfriend broke up with her, trans-
mits to all her friends a sexually explicit photo of the boyfriend that he had sent to her
while they were dating. Id.
304. While male respondents did not report pressure to sext from their partner, twelve
percent of girls did. SEX & TECH SURVEY, supra note 3, at 4.
305. By contrast, only eighteen percent of teenage boys listed pressure from a girl as a
reason for sexting. Id.
306. In the context of sexual assault, for example, nonphysical coercion generally re-
quires abuse of authority or a threat to retaliate or expose the victim to public humiliation
or disgrace. See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
39, 177-78 (1998).
307. Possession of a sexually explicit image is unlawful in some states even if it is not
the product of a request from the recipient. Further, some states include solicitation as a
separate category of misconduct.
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vis-A-vis their male counterparts. For example, the tendency towards self-
doubt, insecurity, and depression that leads girls to look to boys for vali-
dation also makes them more likely to exercise poor judgment with re-
spect to sexual activity.3 08 Thus, when a teenage girl agrees to send a
nude photo to a male peer, her actions may be less voluntary than acqui-
escent to the overtures of a more confident male, whose approval she
values. Seen in this light, her consent is less an expression of free choice
than a surrender in the hope of achieving emotional and psychological
well-being. 309
Recognizing this disparity in power, feminist scholars have long urged
legal reforms to protect women's autonomy in sexual decision making.310
Unfortunately, gender-based distinctions in empowerment have little
resonance in the present-day enforcement of the nation's statutory rape
laws.311 With respect to adolescents of similar age, this deficit has left girls
on an uneven playing field where they face consequences that are serious
and long-lasting. 312 Ironically, while lack of maturity is a sword that re-
stricts the decision making authority of adolescents in a number of con-
texts, it provides no shield to teenage girls who engage in conduct that is
decidedly adult.313
Anti-sexting laws do not diminish the dangers that flow from physical
sexual conduct, but they do provide significant protection from sexual
abuse perpetrated virtually. The breadth of their reach is especially note-
308. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28 (discussing psychological profile of teen-
age girls).
309. Catharine MacKinnon makes a similar argument in the forcible rape context. Be-
lieving that women are oppressed victims of unbridled male power, MacKinnon describes
their consent to sexual intercourse as simply a mechanism for survival, "the despairing
response [of] hopelessness to unequal odds." CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 168 (1989).
310. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual
Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 814 (1988) (identifying physical force, economic pressure,
and deception as unacceptable inducements to sexual conduct); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond
Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Con-
sent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1788 (1992) (differentiating sexual pressure that is moral,
immoral, and criminal); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2180-81 (1995) (arguing that silence or ambivalence should be
insufficient to establish consent [of] sexual intimacy); Robin L. West, Legitimating the Ille-
gitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLum. L. REv. 1442, 1459 (1993) (discussing
legitimate versus illegitimate means of "obtaining sex").
311. Gender-based distinctions persist, however, with respect to the application of stat-
utory rape laws. See Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex
Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 313 n.81 (2006). Although forty-nine
states have adopted gender-neutral standards, the historical bias for cases involving female
victims and male perpetrators remains strong. See Kay L. Levine, No Penis, No Problem,
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357, 378-79 (2006).
312. Oberman, Turning Girls into Women, supra note 35, at 68.
313. Id. at 42-43. For example, contract and tort law generally presume that minors are
not legally accountable for their actions, due to their lack of maturity and insight. Addi-
tionally, in the health care context, courts have been reluctant to allow adolescents-even
those close to the age of majority-to make decisions regarding serious treatment, due to
minors' limited ability to understand fully the nature of such procedures and their attend-
ant risks. See Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P. Wood, Informed Consent to the Medical Treat-
ment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 150-55 (2000).
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worthy. Considering the source of harm in documented cases, legislators
could have focused solely on nonconsensual distribution to multiple par-
ties. By choosing instead to include the possession of sexual images with-
out proof of consent or coercion, sexting prohibitions vindicate harm that
is more speculative in nature and is much more likely, if realized, to affect
female than male adolescents.314 As such, these provisions echo 19th-cen-
tury efforts to raise the age of consent to protect females entering the
industrialized workplace. Like the cyber-revolution today, technological
progress in the late 19th and early 20th centuries challenged traditional
patterns of interaction between the sexes. In the face of this uncertainty,
the law intervened to assist young women by deterring male conduct that
could expose females to harm that their youth and inexperience pre-
vented them from anticipating.
Jurisdictions that elect education-based remedies for first-time offend-
ers achieve a further benefit: the promotion of a normative dialogue
about sexual autonomy in the changing landscape of modern adolescent
relationships. As social media erodes traditional understandings of pri-
vacy, this conversation is necessary to identify boundaries within relation-
ships that preserve dignity and self-respect, especially for girls. To this
end, New York and New Jersey require that their diversionary programs
address the "non-legal consequences" of sexting, including its impact on
relationships315 and its possible link to bullying and cyber-bullying. 316
C. TRANSMISSION OF A SEXT BY ITS CREATOR
The previous section argues that the prosecution of individuals who
possess a sexually explicit image furthers the protectionist principles that
informed statutory rape laws historically. By contrast, prosecuting adoles-
cents who transmit an image depicting only themselves achieves the very
opposite, because it punishes those whom anti-sexting laws are designed
to protect for participating in the very conduct that endangers them in the
first place. This result is fundamentally inconsistent with the enforcement
of statutory rape laws which have never imposed criminal sanctions on
underage victims.
Punishing transmission under these circumstances also contravenes the
criminal law principle that offense victims are members of a protected
314. While less common, adolescent males have also suffered sexting-related harms.
However, as discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 80-82, the misconduct in
these cases tends to be more egregious and depraved, as in Anthony Stanl's "sextortion"
of numerous victims and Dharun Ravi's surreptitious streaming of a homosexual encoun-
ter between his college roommate and another man. In these instances, felony prosecution
under existing criminal statutes obviates the need to charge these defendants with minor
sexting violations, such as possession of a sexually explicit image.
315. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-71.1(b)(2) (West Supp. 2013); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 458-l(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2012).
316. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-71.1(b)(4) (West Supp. 2013); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 458-l(4)(d) (McKinney Supp. 2012).
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class immune from prosecution.3 17 Following this principle, the federal
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 targets
individuals who transport, ship, receive, distribute, or reproduce child
pornography, but excludes minors who engage in the sexually explicit
conduct because they are the victims of the proscribed activity. 318 Thus, a
teenager who appears in pornographic films is not subject to penalty,
even if she falsely claims to be an adult.319 By contrast, an adolescent of
similar age who e-mails a topless photo to her boyfriend may face crimi-
nal or quasi-criminal sanctions, including delinquency adjudication.320
In addition to this troubling inequity, punishing those who transmit or
possess sexual images raises substantive due process concerns. Generally
speaking, to satisfy constitutional requirements, criminal statutes should
disclose a rational connection between the proscribed conduct and the
harm such conduct is meant to redress. 3 2 1 In this regard, legislators have
emphasized the prevention of bullying, cyberbullying, and the potential
loss of educational and employment opportunities as the primary goals of
anti-sexting legislation. 3 2 2 The connection between these harms and the
nonconsensual dissemination of sexual images to third parties is manifest.
However, when applied to individuals who merely send or possess sexu-
ally provocative material that does not implicate third parties, the link is
far more tenuous. While we have seen an exchange of nude photos be-
tween two people involved in an intimate relationship result in trag-
edy,323 given the pervasiveness of sexting among adolescents-one out of
317. See, e.g., United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 (1915) (noting that, as the victim
of the offense, a woman cannot commit the substantive crime of abortion).
318. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (2006).
319. Fifteen-year-old Traci Lords, who would become one of the adult entertainment
industry's biggest stars in the 1980s, falsely claimed to be twenty-one and subsequently
made nineteen feature films before her eighteenth birthday. See Josh Mankiewicz, Traci
Lords: Former X-Rated Star Shares Fight to Overcome Troubled Past, MSNBC (Dec. 8,
2003, 02:34 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080023/ns/datelinenbc-newsmakers/t/
traci-lords/. While adults involved in the production and distribution of her videos faced
prosecution, Ms. Lords did not. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S.
64, 66 (1994).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 159-71.
321. In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Supreme Court noted, to this end,
that the requisite nexus does not exist "if the inference of the one from proof of the other
is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience." Id. at
33. Thus, in Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771 (Okla. 1918), the Oklahoma Criminal Court of
Appeals struck down a Prohibition-era statute, finding that the requisite statutory act of
"keeping a place" was insufficiently linked to the statutory purpose of furnishing intoxicat-
ing liquor. Id. at 773. By contrast, a Washington appellate court upheld a statutory pre-
sumption of criminal intent for individuals in possession of burglarious tools. See State v.
Palmer, 471 P.2d 118, 121 (Wash. App. 1970). Because the legislature included an excep-
tion for one who is "a mechanic, artificer or tradesman at his established shop or place of
business," a rational connection existed "between the fact allowed to be inferred and the
fact proved." Id.
322. See, e.g., S.B. 919, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); Assemb. B. 1561, 214th Leg.,
1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2010) (codified as amended in Assemb. B. 1561, 214th Leg., 2nd Ann.
Sess. (N.J. 2012)).
323. In fact, most of the highly publicized disasters related to sexting began in this way.
See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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every five, according to the Sex & Tech Survey324-the relative paucity of
such extreme consequences indicates that they are decidedly the excep-
tion, not the rule. Thus, prohibiting private, consensual transmission ex-
poses teenagers in vast numbers to the specter of criminal or quasi-
criminal sanctions based on highly speculative assumptions of future
harm.
To justify this result, proponents may argue that, even if few in number,
sexting-related disasters usually begin with images sent in the context of a
personal relationship. It is appropriate, therefore, to prohibit the initial
transmission of the sext to eliminate the possibility of negative down-
stream consequences. While this may be true, legislators could tailor the
laws more narrowly to achieve the same result by, for example, forbid-
ding distribution to anyone other than the original intended recipient. Be-
cause this alternative allows the creation and transmission of the image,
statutes must aggressively deter distribution to third parties, in light of
the potential for harm to the individuals depicted and the risk of child
pornographers gaining access to it. To this end, anti-sexting laws should
impose substantial penalties for any unconsented broadcast to third par-
ties and provide for escalating sanctions based on the nature and extent
of the disclosure. In some circumstances-such as where the sender trans-
mits a sext to multiple parties with the intent to embarrass or humiliate-
even felony liability may be appropriate for minors close to the age of
majority.325
In sum, then, protectionist impulses explain the inclusion of noncon-
sensual third party distribution and coercive possession in anti-sexting
laws but provide a far weaker justification for prohibitions on the trans-
mission of self-depicting nude or semi-nude images to an intimate part-
ner. Constitutional concerns and inconsistencies with criminal law
principles further erode the tenuous connection between this sort of sex-
ual conduct and the harms the laws are meant to redress. Thus, protec-
tionism provides only part of the foundation for these laws. As with
statutory rape, paternalism supplies the missing ingredient, reformulated
in the sexting context to address public morality challenges in the 21st
century.
VII. PATERNALISM REDEFINED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
Paternalism assumes that, because children are not yet able to exercise
appropriate judgment, adult authority is necessary to shield them from
their "cognitive and volitional wantonness."3 2 6 Historically, in the statu-
324. Specifically, 20% of teens reported sending or posting nude or semi-nude pictures
or videos of themselves. SEX & TECH SURVEY, supra note 3, at 1.
325. An individual's liability should also take account of other factors, including
whether he or she is a repeat offender and the defendant's age. With respect to the latter,
developmental differences in decisional maturity and insight would make it unfair to apply
the same standard to a fourteen-year-old eighth grader like Isaiah and a seventeen-year-
old high school senior like Alex Phillips. See supra text accompanying notes 145-58.
326. Tamar Schapiro, Childhood and Personhood, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 575, 589-90 (2003).
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tory rape context, paternalistic impulses manifested primarily in efforts to
preserve the virginity of young women. 327 For adult males, safeguarding
young women's marital prospects was a primary motivation.328 By con-
trast, in fighting to raise the age of consent, social purity reformers of the
late 19th and early 20th centuries emphasized the erosion in cultural and
moral values that they believed was endangering young women in a rap-
idly changing, industrialized society.329 However different their motiva-
tions, the groups shared a common goal: the avoidance of reputational
ruin for young women.330
For today's anti-sexting crusaders, concern about physical and psycho-
logical harm has replaced the Victorian focus on chastity. Notwithstand-
ing this distinction, the primary objective of the two groups of sex-offense
reformers is the same: prevention of the disastrous consequences that
flow from unbridled sexual expression. In pursuit of this goal, statutory
rape laws traditionally targeted males who unscrupulously robbed unsus-
pecting and naYve adolescent girls of their innocence. Anti-sexting laws
include, analogously, individuals who possess sexually provocative images
of girls that may prove compromising down the road.
Many anti-sexting statutes, however, go much further. Whereas statu-
tory rape laws historically regarded females as passive victims immune
from prosecution, there is no corresponding exemption for girls who en-
gage in sexting. This assignment of criminal responsibility to females may
seem profoundly nonpaternalistic; in reality, it is not. It is a strong dose of
legislative "tough love" that recognizes the need to include adolescent
girls to protect them from the potentially dire consequences of their own
impulsive behavior.
Such bold-even revolutionary-action reflects widespread concern
about sexual immorality among the nation's teenagers. According to soci-
ologist Kathleen Bogle, the public views adolescents as increasingly wild
and sexually promiscuous: "out of control" teenagers caught in a down-
ward moral spiral331 who are unable to process the risk that flows from
their actions.332 A recent study by the National Center for Health Statis-
327. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
328. This economic self-interest renders these efforts suspect at best. In fact, Michelle
Oberman argues that male motivations were so "sinister" that they create "considerable
ambivalence regarding [statutory rape laws'] relevance to contemporary society." Ober-
man, Girls in the Master's House, supra note 220, at 800.
329. Id. at 803.
330. Id. at 819.
331. Tara Parker-Pope, The Myth of Rampant Teenage Promiscuity, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
27, 2009, at D6.
332. In short, teenagers "simply do not and often cannot think before they act." Brett
Buckner, Boundless Consequences: With "Sexting," a Seemingly Innocent Decision Can
Lead to a Lifetime of Regret, ANNISTON STAR (Ala.), July 5, 2009 (quoting David Walsh,
founder of the National Institute of Media and the Family and author of Why Do They Act
That Way? A Survival Guide to the Adolescent Brain for You and Your Teen).
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tics reporting a rise in teenage births bolsters such beliefs.333 Comment-
ing on the reversal of a fourteen-year trend, the study's co-author
regarded the shift as "quite noteworthy and a cause for concern." 334
Alarmist media reports about sexting have also exacerbated fears
about unforeseen, negative consequences.335 In perhaps the most evoca-
tive example, a Wichita newspaper reported in 2011 how pimps have
turned that small city in America's heartland into a center for the juvenile
commercial sex trade. Posing as teenage boys on Facebook, pimps be-
friend girls as young as twelve, eventually soliciting sexually provocative
photos. Once the girls comply with the request, the blackmail begins, re-
sulting ultimately in a demand for a face-to-face meeting. At that meet-
ing, the pimps lure the girls into the sex trade with lavish gifts, replaced
soon thereafter by violence and intimidation to ensure compliance.336
One might assume that the pimps limit their focus to girls from finan-
cially distressed or otherwise troubled homes. In fact, their reach is far
broader and includes children from stable families and affluent neighbor-
hoods. 337 Moreover, to be at risk, minors do not need to be trolling the
internet for sex. All they need is a cell phone, a camera, and an adoles-
cent desire to explore their sexuality.338
Technological advances in communication provide the final catalyst for
perceived adolescent promiscuity, 339 as parents discover the ease with
which children can access inappropriate, sexually-charged material on
myriad mobile devices. For example, the popular textPlus application in-
stalled on the Ipad Touch and many cell phones links to chat rooms bear-
ing names like "Hothornyandbi" where visitors are encouraged to "talk
dirty" and "send nudes." 340 Likewise, Snapchat, a free iPhone application
that warns of sexual content and nudity, allows users to send provocative
photos while controlling the amount of time the image remains visible.
Before the image vanishes, any recipient can preserve it by using another
333. JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, BIRTHS: FINAL
DATA FOR 2006 4 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalnvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57
07.pdf.
334. Nicholas Bakalar, Trends Shift, with Births on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009,
at D7.
335. See, e.g., Katya Cengel & Matt Frassica, Sexting Is Often Scandalous to Public
Figures, a Disaster to Relationships, COURIER J. (Louisville), June 13, 2011 (discussing 2009
survey by the Associated Press and MTV that found that "24 percent of 14 to 17 years olds
had engaged in some form of naked sexting"); Jan Peterson, Today's Teenagers Hang Out
in Network Neighborhoods, NEWS-LEADER (Springfield), Aug. 21, 2011, at C1 (noting the
potential peril of sexting); Casey Woods, THE MOMMY POLITIC. "Sexting" Another
Nightmare for Parents, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 10, 2010 (discussing surveys of the frequency
of sexting among adolescents).
336. See generally Ron Sylvester, Wichita a Key Spot for Rescuing Kids in Sex Trade,
WICHITA EAGLE, Sept. 17, 2011.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Alina Tugend, New Worries About Children with Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2009, at B7.
340. Bob Tedeschi, Safeguarding a Child's Mobile Device from Pornography, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012, at B6.
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camera.341
The foregoing underscores the challenges inherent in preserving some
modicum of moral innocence in a digital world that many adults struggle
to comprehend. In an environment where sexting is "relationship cur-
rency" for adolescents,342 it is not surprising that society is striving to
safeguard intimacy and "keep our worst excesses from public view." 343
The assault on sexting is attempting to draw a proverbial line in the sand
to combat the loss of innocence in a culture saturated with sexually ex-
plicit images, where lyrics from popular songs beseech scantily-clad wo-
men to send "a dirty picture." 3 "
An effective solution to the sexting problem must include all partici-
pants. It is clear, in this regard, that females figure prominently in the
creation, transmission, and possession of sexually explicit images. 345 Even
if their sexual bargaining power is not fully commensurate with that of
male partners, 346 adolescent girls no longer suffer from the disempower-
ment implicit in their exemption from 18th- and 19th-century enforce-
ment of statutory rape laws. By virtue of their greater autonomy, female
teens must share responsibility for the perceived erosion in prevailing
moral standards. As such, their inclusion in any proposed remedy is justi-
fied and necessary.
VIII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In the end, the assault on sexting is not as novel as it might seem. It
attempts to achieve in the 21st century what statutory rape laws did in the
18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries: regulating public morality and pro-
tecting the vulnerable. To entertain any hope of success, anti-sexting stat-
utes must target both male and female adolescents and prohibit a broad
range of conduct, including both the transmission and possession of sex-
ual images. With respect to penalties, teenage developmental immaturity
and the desire not to foreclose later educational and employment oppor-
tunities suggest that modest sanctions are appropriate in most cases. Di-
versionary programs focused on education seem a particularly good
option for first-time offenders whose misconduct is not egregious.
In public pronouncements linked to sexting proposals, legislators iden-
tify the deterrence of bullying and cyberbullying as primary goals of anti-
341. Nick Bilton, Disruptions: Indiscreet Photos, Glimpsed Then Gone, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2012, at B4.
342. James Warren, Technology Leapfrogs Schools and Jurisdictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
27, 2009, at A31 (quoting Amanda Lenhart, author of the Pew Internet & American Life
Project report "Teens and Sexting," supra note 6).
343. Id. (discussing the views of psychologist Rollo May).
344. E.g., TAIO CRUZ & KE$HA, DIRTY PICrURE (Universal Island Records 2010).
345. Pamela Paul, He Sexts, She Sexts More Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at 6
(citing a recent study finding that women are more likely than men to send nude photo-
graphs and sexually explicit text messages).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
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sexting initiatives. 347 While events like the Logan and Witsell suicides un-
derscore the importance of this mission, it is important to remember, at
the same time, that sexting is a relatively small part of the nation's bully-
ing and cyber-bullying problem. Teenagers are bullied every day for a
host of other reasons, 348 sometimes with tragic results. For example, in
2006, thirteen-year-old Megan Meier killed herself after "Josh," a sixteen-
year-old whom she had met online, severed their relationship and told
Megan "the world would be a better place without her." "Josh" was, in
fact, a fictitious creation of the mother of an acquaintance, designed to
manipulate Megan emotionally. 349 Likewise, fifteen-year-old Phoebe
Prince, a transfer student from Ireland, hanged herself after months of
unrelenting physical and verbal abuse from classmates at school and on-
line.350 Sadly, there are many other victims with similar stories and
outcomes.351
Given the breadth of the cyberbullying challenge, the focus on sexting
seems oddly disproportionate, unless there are other considerations at
play. I strongly suspect that there are. The need to protect children from
sexting-related harm is coupled with a desperate, paternalistic effort to
restore the moral innocence that is rapidly disappearing in the cyberworld
where most adolescents live. We cannot eliminate our children's ability to
transmit and receive sexually explicit material; however, imposing sanc-
tions on this activity should promote better choices.
347. See, e.g., S.B. 919 § 1(a)(4), 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (involvement in sext-
ing subjects students to "long-term social, emotional, and psychological harms as a result of
harassment and bullying"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-71.1(b)(4) (West Supp. 2013) (same);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 458-1(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 2012) (requiring remedial programs
for those engaged in sexting to address its possible link to bullying and cyber-bullying).
348. The Cyberbullying Research Center estimates that one in five middle school stu-
dents experiences cyber-bullying. See What is Cyberbullying?, NAT'L CRIME PREVENTION
CoUNcIL, http:// www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/what-is-cyberbullying (last visited Apr.
17, 2012).
349. See generally Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at A23.
350. See generally Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, Court Documents Detail a Teenage
Girl's Final Days of Fear and Bullying, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at A12.
351. See, e.g., Jamie Wolf, Note, The Playground Bully Has Gone Digital: The Dangers
of Cyberbullying, the First Amendment Implications, and the Necessary Responses, 10 CAR-
DOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHics J. 575, 576-79 (2012).
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